The contemporary forest concessions in West and Central Africa: chronicle of a foretold decline? by Karsenty, Alain
    
  
 
Forestry Policy and Institutions Working Paper 34 
 
 
 
The contemporary forest concessions in West 
and Central Africa: chronicle of a foretold 
decline? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 
   
  
 
 
The contemporary forest concessions in West 
and Central Africa: chronicle of a foretold 
decline? 
 
 
 
 
Alain Karsenty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
Rome, 2016 
  
 
  
  
 
Disclaimer 
The Forestry Policy and InstitutionsWorking Papers report on issues in the work programme of Fao. 
These working papers do not reflect any official position of FAO. Please refer to the FAO Web site 
(www.fao.org/forestry) for official information. 
 
The purpose of these papers is to provide early information on ongoing activities and programmes, to 
facilitate dialogue and to stimulate discussion. 
 
The Forest Economics, Policy and Products Division works in the broad areas of strenghthening 
national institutional capacities, including research, education and extension; forest policies and 
governance; support to national forest programmes; forests, poverty alleviation and food security; 
participatory forestry and sustainable livelihoods. 
 
 
For further information please contact: 
 
For further information, please contact: 
Cesar Sabogal 
Forestry Officer 
Forestry Department, FAO 
Viale Delle terme di Caracalla 
00153 Rome, Italy 
Email: Cesar.Sabogal@fao.org  
Website: www.fao.org/forestry  
 
Comments and feedback are welcome. 
 
For quotation: 
FAO.2016. The contemporary forest concessions in West and Central Africa: chronicle of a foretold 
decline?, by, Alain Karsenty. Forestry Policy and Institutions Working Paper No. 34. Rome. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
© FAO 2016
 vi 
 
Content 
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 1 
A. Objectives of the report .................................................................................................................. 8 
B. Land status in West and Central Africa ........................................................................................... 9 
C. Sub-regions and country’s profile in brief ..................................................................................... 11 
I. Increase of forest cover losses in the two sub-regions ............................................................ 11 
II. Countries in brief ...................................................................................................................... 13 
D. The forest concessions in West and Central Africa ....................................................................... 22 
I. Industrial concessions .............................................................................................................. 22 
II. The debate on the negative impacts of concessions ............................................................... 32 
III. Community forestry under concession regime ........................................................................ 35 
IV. Recreational hunting concessions ............................................................................................ 39 
E. Managing the concessions ............................................................................................................ 40 
F. Allocating the concessions ............................................................................................................ 44 
G. Taxation regime ............................................................................................................................. 47 
I. An issue less critical in the forest reform agendas ................................................................... 47 
II. Transparency and Independent Observer ................................................................................ 47 
H. Experiences with Log Export Bans ................................................................................................. 49 
I. The impact of forest certification .................................................................................................. 55 
J. New interests for forestland and new challenges for the concession regime .............................. 57 
K. Policy options for sustainable concessions ................................................................................... 62 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 67 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................... 71 
 
 
 
  
  
 vii 
List of tables 
Table 1: Synthesis of the area covered by concessions and areas certified in West and Central Africa ............... 25 
Table 2: Estimates of production and employment provided by the artisanal/informal sector (Sources: 
documents by Lescuyer and Cerutti, 2006 and 2013, completed by various other sources) ................................. 55 
Table 3: Most significant change in ownership, from European to Asian company ............................................. 58 
List of figures 
Figure 1:  Gross tree cover loss in Central Africa __________________________________________________ 11 
Figure 2:  Gross tree cover loss 2001-2014 per country in Central Africa _______________________________ 12 
Figure 3: Gross tree cover loss in West Africa ____________________________________________________ 12 
Figure 4: Tree cover losses in Cameroon (30% threshold) ___________________________________________ 13 
Figure 5: Tree cover losses in Congo (30% threshold) ______________________________________________ 14 
Figure 6: Tree cover losses in DR Congo (30% threshold) ___________________________________________ 15 
Figure 7:  Tree cover losses in Gabon (30% threshold) _____________________________________________ 17 
Figure 8: Tree cover losses in CAR (30% threshold) ________________________________________________ 18 
Figure 9: Tree cover losses in Equatorial Guinea (30% threshold) _____________________________________ 19 
Figure 10: Tree cover losses in Côte d'Ivoire (30% threshold) ________________________________________ 20 
Figure 11: Tree cover losses in Ghana (30% threshold) _____________________________________________ 21 
Figure 12: Tree cover losses in Liberia (30% threshold) _____________________________________________ 22 
Figure 13:  A glimpse on forest concession areas in Central Africa ____________________________________ 23 
Figure 14: Forest concessions in Liberia _________________________________________________________ 24 
Figure 15: Map of Ghana showing high forest zone where concessions are concentrated _________________ 24 
Figure 16: Average size of the Forest Management Units in Central Africa _____________________________ 26 
Figure 17: Area concentrated by main concessionaires in Central Africa  _______________________________ 27 
Figure 18: Concentration of areas by commercial partners _________________________________________ 28 
Figure 19: Maps of the "finages" (customary territories) overlapping with the CEB Precious Wood concessions 
(Gabon) __________________________________________________________________________________ 36 
Figure 20: Community development series in the Mokabi (Rougier Group) FMU in Congo (Rep.) ____________ 37 
Figure 21: Area and proportion of concessions with a management plan (in hectares and % of total attributed 
concessions) ______________________________________________________________________________ 41 
Figure 22: Evolution of the timber production in Equatorial Guinea (thousands of cubic meters) ____________ 50 
Figure 23: Log exported by central Africa’s countries and Liberia: ____________________________________ 52 
Figure 24: In Gabon, the log export ban entailed a sharp drop of the production and overcapacities for wood 
processing (data: ITTO Annual Statistics On-Line) _________________________________________________ 54 
Figure 25: Map of the Intact Forest Landscapes and their impact on the concessions _____________________ 56 
 
List of boxes 
Box 1:  Framework of the forest land status in Cameroon __________________________________________ 10 
Box 10: Conservation concessions in central Africa _______________________________________________ 60 
Box 11: Waiting for FLEGT licenses _____________________________________________________________ 60 
Box 2: Two socially advanced companies in Gabon and Congo ______________________________________ 31 
Box 3: Small-scale enterprise as alternative to industrial concessions ________________________________ 34 
Box 4: Acknowledging and managing the dual dimension of the community forestry___________________ 39 
Box 5: The experience of Cameroon with an auctioning system for allocating concessions _______________ 44 
Box 6: Independent observation in support of forest law enforcement ______________________________ 49 
Box 7: The opportunity cost of the log export ban ________________________________________________ 51 
Box 8: Gabon’s experience with the log export ban (LEB): facing a logjam __________________________ 53 
Box 9: The issue of Intact Forest Landscapes ____________________________________________________ 57 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 viii 
 
List of acronyms 
AAC  annual allowable cut 
BCEAO  Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
BEAC Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale 
CAGDF Cercle d’Appui à la Gestion Durable des Forêts 
CAR Central African Republic 
CCBA Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CDS Community development series 
CEB Compagnie Équatoriale des Bois 
CEMAC Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
CIB Congolais Industrielle des Bois 
CIBN Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
EC European Commission 
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
ERA Ecosystem Restoration Associates 
EU European Union 
EUTR European Union Timber Regulation 
FCFA Franc CFA 
FCPF Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank 
FDL Development Communitarian Fund 
FIP Forest Investment Programme 
FLEGT Forest, Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
FMU forest management unit 
FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
FRA Forest Resources Assessment 
FSC Forest Stewardship Council 
FSC-CW Forest Stewardship Council – Controled Wood 
GDP gross domestic product 
GFW Global Forest Watch  
GIS Global Information System 
IFL Intact Forest Landscapes 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IO International Observer 
IPE Individual Protection Equipment 
ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization 
LEB Logs Export Ban 
LER Log Export Rights  
MHD minimum harvestable diameter 
  
 ix 
MEF Ministry of Forest Economics (Congo Rep.) 
MNS Market News Service 
NTFP non timber forest product 
OFAC Observatoire des Forêts d’Afrique Centrale 
OLB Origine Légale des Bois (Legal origin of wood) 
PAFC Pan-African Forest Certification scheme 
PEF Forest Exploitation Perimeters (Côte d’Ivoire) 
PEFC Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
PES payments for environmental services 
PFE Permanent Forest Estate 
PUP Private Use Permits 
R-PP REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal 
REDD 
REDD+ 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
REM Resources Extraction Monitoring 
SFM sustainable forest management 
TFT The Forest Trust 
TLTV Timber Legality & Traceability Verification 
TUC Timber Utilization Contract 
VAT value added tax 
VCS Verified Carbon Standard 
VCU  Verified Carbon Units 
VLC Verification of Legal Compliance 
VPA Voluntary Partnership Agreement 
WB World Bank 
WCS  World Conservation Society 
WRI  World Resources Institute 
WWC Wildlife Works Carbon 
 
 
 1 
Executive summary 
1. Concessions are covering almost 56 million ha in West and Central Africa (50 million ha for 
Central Africa or about 30% of the total tropical moist area). Altogether, the concessions produce 
around 10 million m3 of roundwood each year. A similar volume of timber is likely to be 
mobilized by the artisanal / informal sector, sourced principally outside the concessions but with 
significant encroachments inside the concessions when those ones are very large and the 
population density is locally important – such as in the DRC, notably. 
2. In West and Central Africa, forest lands are generally considered as “public”, although to become 
private property of the State (or other public entities, general local councils), specific procedures 
of titling entailing local consultations should be performed.1 Often confused with the legal land 
status, there is the vocational land use, which starts with zoning plans of wooded lands and 
should be eventually legally enforced by another procedure, the gazetting. But some countries 
such as Cameroon use a single procedure, the gazetting, to create simultaneously the private 
domain of the State and the permanent forest estate (PFE). 
3. A concession is a bilateral or unilateral legal act by which an authority grants a private or public 
personal use right or a privilege2. In a public-private partnership perspective, the concession 
contract requests an individual or a company to build up a public work or to achieve a public 
service, at his own expenses, with or without a subsidy, and who may remunerate itself (or 
himself) through the commercial use of the work or the service. Public services are the 
preparation of forest management plans, infrastructure building, and social services (e.g. schools, 
medical dispensaries) as stipulated in concession contracts. 
4. Relations between forest companies and local populations are often complex. They are subject 
to conflicts over commercial timber trees (which may have other functions locally) and 
environmental damage, but at the same time the arrival of logging companies is often hailed – 
above all by local populations themselves – as a significant economic opportunity in remote and 
landlocked areas. Demands and expectations of local populations usually cover medicine and 
equipment of health care centres, contribution to local education through building or funding 
schools, employment and training for young men from riparian villages, distribution of food and 
beverage, construction or maintenance of roads; and in some cases, provision of additional 
public infrastructure such as electricity and wells. 
Social dimensions of the concessions’ system 
5. Community forests are often organized on the model of the concession, with an exclusive area 
for exploitation of a given resource and specifications. Cameroon stands for the oldest 
experience of institutionalized community forestry (since the end of the 1990s). The outcomes 
are not convincing due to, on the one hand, all the red tape imposed by the administration, and, 
on the other, the difficulties of collective action in Cameroonian forest villages. To make matters 
worse, some illegal loggers are using legal documents from community forestry to “launder” 
their timber for export. 
6. Within the framework of forest management certification, some companies (e.g. the CEB-
Precious Wood in Gabon) have started mapping the customary territories overlapping the 
industrial concessions. They use such maps as a key for benefit sharing, with local investments 
decided jointly with communities and proportionate to the area of customary territory 
                                                            
1 The exception is Ghana, where forest reserves are owned by the customary « stool land » authorities, but managed in 
trust by the government forestry agency. 
2 FAO (2003). 
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overlapping with the industrial concession. A new generation of forest regulations calls for 
benefit sharing with “riparian” populations (Cameroon, Gabon, DR Congo), and/or for 
establishing “community development areas” within the industrial concessions (Congo). In the 
DR Congo, a 2014 decree paves the way for a dual conception of community forestry, 
distinguishing between the “forest of the local community” (that is the formally recognized 
customary territory that may or may not overlap with industrial concessions) and the 
“community concession”, which is a subdivision of the forest of the local community where the 
community has exclusive rights to the harvesting of commercial timber. 
7. These dynamics, if properly accompanied by public policies and institutions, may trigger a 
transformation of the concession system in Central Africa towards the recognition of overlapping 
rights associated with different “institutional layers” on the same area. The overlapping areas 
might not only be a key element for benefit sharing, but they could also become joint 
management areas. As for the community-based concessions, allowing them to enjoy exclusive 
rights by moving back, when needed, the industrial concession boundaries could help to create 
small-scale enterprises that could benefit from association with nearby large industries, as has 
happened in other tropical regions. 
Logging and management characteristics  
8. In African moist tropical natural forests, logging is highly selective, due to (i) the high diversity of 
species and their heterogeneity with respect to their processing aptitude and market demand; 
and (ii) the high transport costs, often dependent on road operations. In Central Africa, the 
volume of commercial timber extracted rarely exceeds 10-13 m3 per hectare, and is often around 
4-8 m3 (0.5 tree per hectare) – for instance in the DRC. This corresponds to approximately 4 to 
8% of the standing timber volume (all species), which is significantly less than harvesting rates in 
Southeast Asia. In West Africa, given the lowest transport costs, the selectivity was less 
pronounced. For instance, in Liberia the average forest yield was around 21 m3 per ha by the end 
of the 2000’s. In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, where road infrastructure is better, the yields used to 
be around 40 m3 per ha, but with the gradual exhaustion of the forest resources current harvests 
are lesser. 
9. Management plans are mandatory in all countries. They are to be prepared by the 
concessionaire, (except in CAR where a public structure prepares the plan) and their 
implementation should be seen as an absolute precondition for keeping the concession. The 
reality is far from this principle, and it is very likely that the majority of non FSC-certified 
concessions (or those having certification of legal sourcing or timber, even though this is less 
stringent) does not implement fully their management plans, and many do not implement it at 
all. 
10. In Central Africa, the two pillars of the silvicultural system are the Minimum Harvestable 
Diameter (MHD) and the Felling Cycle. Management plans are based on a “management 
inventory” (sampling of 1-3 % of the whole forest area) performed by the forest company using 
national norms. The management inventory allows for estimating the annual possibility, the 
distribution of the trees (to define the future Annual Allowable Cut - AAC) and the diametric 
structure of the population, needed for assessing the dynamic of renewal of the various species 
and set the MHD. The management plan should be completed during the first three years of the 
concession contract. During this period, the concessionaire is granted a “provisional 
management agreement”, allowing him to harvest the AAC (expressed in area and volume). To 
allow for some flexibility, there are 5-years blocs where the AAC can be open simultaneously (2 
to 3, depending on the country). AAC must be closed anyway after 2 or 3 years of activity. Before 
the logging operations, a 100% inventory of the harvestable trees (commercial species above the 
MHD) must be performed and is generally done on an annual basis for the AAC. In West Africa, 
the rules are quite similar in Liberia (5-years compartment planning, 100% pre-harvest inventory 
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of commercial species above MDH) and in Ghana (operators are allowed to log compartments 
grouped in 5-years coupes within the five years). In Ghana, the Forest Service surveys the 
compartment, recording recovery commercial timber tree larger than 50cm diameter an 
mapping them. From this map the Forest Service calculates the total number of trees the 
company can take using a “yield allocation formula”. 
11. Cutting cycles are 25 years in Congo and Gabon, 30 years in Cameroon and Liberia, 40 years in 
Ghana. In CAR, the duration is determined by the management plan, between 20 years 
(secondary forests) and 30 years (primary-like forests). In Côte d’Ivoire, the cutting cycle is 
generally of 22 to 25 years. Silvicultural treatments after exploitation are not mandatory in 
Central Africa. It is generally considered that the most important silvicultural actions are 
associated with the harvest itself, and with the raising of the MHD when deemed necessary for 
the regeneration of the stand. In West Africa, replanting is mandatory in Ghana (on branch roads, 
skidding trails and on sidings ) and Côte d’Ivoire (1 ha should be replanted for 250 m3 harvested). 
12. Sustainability of harvests without silvicultural treatments is, however, questioned in Central 
Africa. Simulations over 2-3 cutting cycles suggests some key commercial species (which are also 
light-demanding species) will not be recovered, even without considering the initial high volume 
called “bonus” derived from the exploitation in primary-like forests (where timber volume has 
accumulated over a long time) and their volumes will slightly decrease over the felling cycles - 
without the survival of the species being threatened, however. The traditional response would 
be to raise the MHD of such species, but it would create important financial troubles for the 
companies. On the other hand, given the extremely selective logging practiced in Central Africa, 
many potentially marketable trees remain untouched and it is likely that the market demand for 
timber will evolve (along with the processing technologies) over the time of 2-3 cutting cycles (50 
- 60 years and more). Therefore, the issue of sustainability of the best current practices remains 
an open question. 
Allocation system 
13. Many countries claim that they are allocating the concessions through a transparent process, and 
some through tendering. In reality, allocation is still largely discretionary and it is only in 
Cameroon that the tendering is based on public auctioning, which has yielded interesting but 
controversial results (increase of the risk for the industry). The auction system has been effective 
in capturing most of the economic forest rent and both government and local council revenues 
have increased. It has strongly favoured transparency and has limited corruption, even though 
loopholes in the bidding process increasingly exploited by some players have not been addressed 
by the government3.  
Taxation 
14. Taxation regimes have evolved over time. After being historically low and concentrated on log 
exports, taxes have been increased on the concession’s area itself and, in some countries, has 
been globally raised as a consequence of the influence on the World Bank on the reforms 
initiated in the forestry sector. But after the economic crisis of 2008-09, tax pressure has been 
considerably lightened, through the conclusion of bilateral agreements between companies and 
fiscal administrations. In the meantime, the “parafiscalité” (taxes or “contributions” not planned 
in the Finance Law but created at administrative level - whether or not legally) has considerably 
increased and has replaced somehow the formal taxation regime, with a blurred boundary with 
corruption and racket. 
                                                            
3 Some loggers have made quite high bids, but have then used the three year provisional period to high-grade the whole of 
the concession. This is, however, more due to poor law enforcement than to any flaw in the auction system itself. 
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15. Transparency has increased but public information is still difficult to access and governments are 
reluctant to provide on-line updated information on concession holders. Fiscal information is still 
a very sensitive matter, and transparency is extremely limited, in spite of the EITI (Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative).4 The introduction of independent observers has improved the 
situation regarding the level of law enforcement in the field. However, the public information 
available has rarely translated into sanctions or reform of the monitoring system of the 
administration. 
Experiences with log export bans 
16. Partial or total log export bans have been introduced in several countries, but are only strongly 
implemented in a couple of countries, such as Gabon, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Cameroon and 
Congo use quotas allocated to companies. Gabon, which was the first timber producer and log 
exporter of central Africa, abruptly banned log exports in 2011. The outcome of this experience is 
disappointing, since the production fell sharply, the fiscal receipts almost vanished and the 
employment did not surge as expected. Given the insufficient competiveness of the processed 
products, the volumes previously exported as logs have not been replaced by processed 
products, and the financial viability of the forest companies has been severely reduced. This 
reveals the existence of an opportunity cost of local processing on several segments of timber 
and would call for more innovative policies, possibly inspired by the cap-and-trade systems 
(transferable quotas) existing in fisheries and for pollution mitigation through Log Export Rights. 
Employment 
17. Overall, concessions provide direct employment for around 135,000 workers in the selected 
countries of West (Liberia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire) and Central Africa (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, 
DRC, CAR and Equatorial Guinea). The informal sector is likely to provide many more jobs in 
populated countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ghana, and Cameroon, according to estimates 
(more than 100,000 jobs in Cameroon, up to 15,000 permanent jobs in DRC and probably much 
more if one takes into account also the non-permanent jobs). One specificity of jobs provided by 
the timber sector is that they are among the rare jobs available in remote and economically 
marginalized areas (the forest zones), and which target non skilled people. It is estimated that 
one permanent job in Central Africa sustains the livelihood of 10-12 relatives 
Certification 
18. Forest management certification has been a game-changer in Central Africa, for the six 
companies who have been able to get their concessions certified. Five of them are EU-based 
companies5, with markets oriented toward the Western world and large areas. Certification 
pushes companies to legal auto-regulation, since a negative audit would mean jeopardizing their 
market shares in some EU markets. No new concession has been certified for a couple of years, 
now, raising the question about the potential of the forest management certification for 
expanding beyond the so-called “early-movers”. Not all certified companies have reached the 
same level of achievement, but some have reached an impressive level with respect to social 
criteria, rights recognition and benefits sharing with local communities. “Success stories” in 
Gabon and Congo are often exposed, but such achievements are fragile as the cost of reaching 
them is often questioned by the shareholders of the related international groups. 
19. Investment in the forest management certification means significant costs, which are not always 
compensated by a price premium. Legality certification (OLB, VLC, FSC-CW…) that has multiplied 
                                                            
4 EITI is active in many African countries, but this is generally in mining and minerals, with Liberia currently the only country 
that has signed up its forestry sector for EITI. 
5 Congolaise industrielle de Bois (CIB), the largest FSC certified company in Africa, is owned by OLAM which is 
headquartered in Singapore. 
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since the entry in force of the EUTR, somehow compete with forest management certification 
and competition is likely to increase when FLEGT licenses will be available in the future.  
20. Internal discussions within the FSC tend to crystalize on the Congo Basin, with pressures to 
strengthen the requirements for the industrial concessions, especially with the new 
requirements of the “Intact Forest Landscapes” (IFL), which could force some concessionaires 
who are currently FSC-certified but have so-called IFL in their concessions to abandon the FSC 
and to seek an alternative with the PEFC/PAFC currently pushed by some stakeholders. 
Changing conditions and transfer of assets 
21. The markets for African timber have profoundly changed during the last 15 years. China, and 
increasingly other emerging Asian markets are replacing the traditional western outlet, and 
especially the EU market. As a consequence, Asian interests are gradually taking over European 
ones, and most of the area and the industrial production are now taken by Asian companies. 
Since the profitability of the activity is low (when complying with the regulations in force), many 
European companies have  sold their activities to Asian companies who, on the one hand, are 
sometimes less concerned about some regulations and, on the other hand, have more effective 
trading networks. 
22. Since 3-4 years, there is almost no more “primary” or “primary-like” productive forest to be 
exploited within the “perimeter of profitability” (depending mainly on transport infrastructures) 
of the forestland in Central Africa. All forests have been “secondarized” to a greater or lesser 
extent, meaning the “primary forest rent” has been largely dissipated by the first cutting cycle. As 
a consequence, profits are lower than they have been in the past and the industry has started to 
restructure to adapt to the reduced availability of traditional commercial species: there are many 
species potentially marketable left in the logged forests of Central Africa. Important investments 
in processing and marketing will be required to re-create opportunities for a new economic rent, 
but the “insiders” (current concessionaires) do not appear to have the resources to make this 
investment effort. 
A low policy priority 
23. Forest concessions and the timber sector in general have received a lower policy priority in the 
last 5-10 years in the region, in spite of REDD+ (or due to the lower expectations vis-à-vis this 
scheme, leading to disregard the forest sector at a whole). In West and Central Africa, economic 
growth is associated with the extractive industries, and to a lesser extent to the large-scale 
expansion of perennial crops, such as oil palm, rubber and cocoa. Mining permits (exploration 
and exploitation) have a legal (and political) priority over forest concessions. Many concessions 
are overlapped by mining permits, causing difficulties to follow management plans and, in some 
cases, abandonment of forest management certification. Governments are also aggressively 
promoting agro-business, often at the expense of the forest concessions. 
24. One part of the concession forest sector in Africa is more and more “externally driven” in terms 
of ecological and social norms, because of the concern of Western consumers and public opinion 
about the fate of tropical forests, connected to global climate change issues. This creates 
incentives to raise the environmental standards of the global forest industry, and favours large 
scale concessions that can cope with the stringent requirements embodied in legal certification 
and log tracking, sustainable forest management certification, social service provision for local 
populations, and significant fiscal contribution. This has the effect of squeezing out small-scale 
operators, who often resort to becoming, or remaining “informal” to avoid overregulation and 
associated corruption. In countries where the domestic market share is low, producers face 
strong competition from other countries, corporations and business models. Concentration and 
restructuration (of the export-oriented industry) on the one hand, and fragmentation (of the 
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domestic-oriented industry) on the other, seem to be the current trends in the logging industry 
of the Congo Basin. 
Uncertain international initiatives 
25. REDD+ will probably not benefit the forest concessions, despite the “Sustainable Management of 
Forest” eligibility activity associated with the “+” of REDD+. Increase of the minimum harvestable 
diameter, and, to a lesser extent, extension of the cutting cycle length can increase carbon stocks 
but the opportunity costs will be significant for the companies. Given the current difficulties with 
the carbon markets and the low carbon credits’ prices, perspectives are limited. It is also unlikely 
that the so-called “voluntary markets” could be an outlet for the carbon credits that would be 
possibly emitted by concessionaires through “REDD+ projects”, given the mixed perception of 
industrial logging. In addition, the issue of non-permanence is a serious one, given the frequent 
changes in ownership of the concessions – and also the risk of conversion, though this risk is 
often lower than in forest areas outside concessions. Moreover, the second “D” of REDD+ 
(avoided degradation) will more likely pave the way toward “conservation concessions” that 
could be remunerated, rather than for “improved logging concessions”. 
26. The FLEGT program and the VPAs proposed by the EU are facing huge difficulties in W& C Africa, 
especially because almost all VPAs foresee legalizing domestic as well as export timber. The 
difficulty of ensuring and verifying all the timber production at national level has been 
underestimated both by the EU and by the African governments who have, in most countries, 
pushed for including also the domestic market in the scope of the VPA agreements. Companies 
exporting to Western markets sought for legality certification proposed by private bodies, and 
want them recognized as “proof of legality” by the African national authorities and “negligible 
risk” by the EU national authorities for the exported timber so far. FLEGT program has failed to 
reduce the level of illegal timber at country level and the unfair competition between players so 
far. 
What alternatives? 
27. In moist tropical forests of Africa, autonomous community forestry is generally not capable of 
replacing the industrial concessions and achieve sustainability of timber harvesting through 
small-scale enterprises. Hence, the decline of the industrial concessions regime is simply 
associated with forest degradation and triggers forest conversion, at small or large scale. This call 
for an evolution of the concession regime, more adapted to the growing population pressure and 
local land rights claims, and oriented toward a more intensive use of a wider range of natural 
resources 
28. With the increasing demographic density in many parts of W&C Africa, the room for large-scale 
concessions is shrinking (exceptions being essentially Gabon and Republic of Congo). Competition 
by other land-uses and by other tenure systems (small-scale enterprises, private or community-
based) is more acute.  
- A pessimistic scenario anticipates a progressive fragmentation of most of the 
concessions, with a growing informalisation of the timber activity (including community 
forestry, which will remain largely unregulated) and a declining export sector.  
- An optimistic scenario would anticipate an evolution of the concession system, from a 
mono-exploitation (timber) to a broader spectrum of activities, mixing SFM and 
valorisation of NTFPs, genetic resources, agroforestry production, sports hunting, energy 
production and distribution… Such “concessions 2.0” would require an evolution of the 
legal framework and public policies favouring such diversification, as it has begun in 
Congo where recreational hunting can overlap timber management on the same 
concession area. From both a development and a human rights perspective, however, 
this would be acceptable only if it entailed the recognition of communities’ customary 
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territories within the concessions, to develop jointly such new economic activities with 
the concerned populations. 
Policy recommendations 
29. The desired evolution of the concession regime highlighted above should be supported by a set 
of policy reforms favouring the rule of law and recognition of overlapping tenure rights in the 
concessions. The main policy recommendations are: 
• Zoning plan and establishment of Permanent Forest Estate in each country. 
• Gazetting all the concessions applying FPIC (Free, Prior and Informed Consent) principles. 
• Strict procedure for mining inside concessions and obligations of ecological 
compensation by the extractive industries and financial compensation for timber 
concessionaires affected. 
• Public availability of updated information on the concessions (surface, production, 
holders, etc.) on Ministries’ website. 
• Inclusion of industrial forestry in the EITI by governments (as in Liberia) 
• Systematic mapping of the customary territories in and outside the concessions and 
participatory management of customary territories inside concessions. 
• Organization of the dual dimension of community forestry, combining overlapping areas 
and exclusive community concession areas. On this basis, allowing for the economic use 
of several resources beyond timber, through recreational hunting, NTFPs exploitation 
and processing, agroforestry and other sustainable activities. Such commercial multiple 
use should be based on joint-ventures with local communities, after mapping of their 
customary territories included into the concessions and subsequent recognition of 
overlapping tenure rights.  
• Cancellation of concessions without management plans deposed after 3 years maximum 
(with a 1-year grace period for exceptional circumstances). 
• Strict enforcement of the volume and boundaries of the Annual Allowable Cut granted 
for the first 3 years (to prevent over-exploitation of the provisional area and high-grading 
of the whole concession area). 
• Use of transferable national quotas for log exports to be auctioned instead of LEB. 
• Organize logging rights of small-scale loggers with community concessions and in 
farmer’s fallows by adapting tree tenure as in Côte d’Ivoire (recognition of tree 
ownership for farmers using uncontested land plots). 
• Provide incentives to certified concessions (forest management schemes) through tax 
cuts, for instance the area fees. Foregone revenues would be compensated by 
international initiatives (such as REDD+ or FIP). 
• Earmark forest taxes for a fund devoted to cover the costs of certification and audits for 
the companies (mutualisation of the cost of certification)  
• Set procedures for “automatic” refunding of VAT for the exporting industries.  
• Streamlined procedures for public purchasing policies of timber based on verification of 
legality in all African timber producer countries. This should also be adopted by all donor-
funded projects. 
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A. Introduction 
Deforestation is still occurring at an alarming rate worldwide, in spite of a recent slowdown 
attributable essentially to the improvement of the situation in the Brazilian Amazon over the last 8-
10 years and the fact that accessible lowland forests in Sumatra and Borneo have almost all been 
converted. Losses of natural forests not only degrade the livelihoods of forest-dependent people, but 
also entail irreversible destruction of biodiversity and contribute to the aggravation of global 
warming, since land-use changes represent between 10 to 15% of anthropogenic carbon emissions 
worldwide.  
Given this context, industrial forest concessions are seen by some as an indirect driver of 
deforestation (and a direct driver of degradation), but other analysts emphasize the absence of 
association between selective logging and deforestation, and consider that well-managed 
concessions may represent an asset against pressures for forest land conversion, either by 
agribusiness companies or by smallholders. The forest concession concept gained traction in the last 
decade, being introduced in highly forested countries such as Brazil and Russia, where governments 
intend to use this regime to avoid leaving large tracts of forests under uncertain tenure situation 
which favours appropriation through illegal (but often tolerated) deforestation. 
On the other hand, with the increase of rural population densities in many tropical areas and 
legitimate claims for being granted new rights on forest lands often considered as public/State 
estates, the existence of forest concessions is challenged. Many consider that concessions should be 
dismantled in favour of community forests, supposed to provide more benefits to local populations. 
But many community forests are also forest concessions, and running a viable community-based 
enterprise oriented on timber is not an easy task, particularly in places where infrastructures are 
degraded, transport costs are high and markets difficult to access – especially with the competition 
of a growing informal sector delivering (illegal) timber at lower cost on the domestic markets. 
Forest concessions are at a crossroad. Their legitimacy rests on their transparency, their strict 
compliance with laws and regulations and the social and ecological guarantees they can display. 
Thanks to both public policies promoting forest management and private certification schemes, the 
quality of management of industrial forest concessions improved in several countries, although this 
trend is very heterogeneous, with question marks on the effectiveness of the application of legally 
requested management plans in numerous concessions. With the change of structure of exploited 
forests, the processing industry will have to innovate to avoid the erosion of financial profitability 
which is already observable in many concessions complying with legal management rules. And 
concessions will have to change in order to accommodate to local land tenure claims and share more 
benefits with local populations. 
This report seeks to take stock of the status and the evolution of forest concessions in West and 
Central Africa, with an emphasis given to the industrial concessions. It provides an analysis of the 
concessions regime, with its legal, institutional and technical aspects, examines the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the current concessions regime, and discusses the possible evolution and perspective 
of the forest concessions in this sub-region. 
Defining forest concession 
According to FAO’s Land Tenure Thesaurus (Ciparisse et al., 2003), a concession is a bilateral or 
unilateral legal act by which an authority grants a private or public personal use right or a privilege.  
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More precisely, Gray (2002) defined a forest concession as “a 
contract between a forest owner and another party permitting 
the harvesting (forest utilization contracts) and/or managing 
(forest management services contracts) of specified resources 
from a given forest area”. However, it is useful to notice that 
concessions and especially forest concessions involve the idea of 
achieving also a public work or service, at the own expense of 
the concessionaire. For instance, preparation of forest 
management plans has been for a long time considered as a 
responsibility of the Government, through the forest service in 
West and Central Africa (and some Forest Codes are still 
mentioning this), but this responsibility has been transferred to 
the concessionaires (except in CAR). Likewise, social obligations 
of the concessionaires has gradually increased into the 
specifications; in Congo, the management plans of one major 
company embodied provisions to ensure the “food security” of 
his workers and their family. In that respect, the concession 
agreement is typical of the modern “public-private” 
partnerships by which public services obligations are devolved 
to private companies along with the privilege of an economic 
activity requiring government’s authorization. 
B. Land status in West and Central Africa 
In West and Central Africa, forest lands are generally considered 
as “public”, even though some countries such as Cameroon 
(also Togo and Senegal) have a specific land status (called 
“domaine national” or “domaine rural”) where the State is not 
the owner of the land, but a trustee administering the land for 
the benefit of the nation. This status is “by default” since a land 
without land title, private or public, is considered as part of the 
national domain. For a land to become private, it needs a 
procedure called “immatriculation” (titling), often long and 
costly. Titling is open to individuals, companies, land councils or 
the State. A land titled to the name of the State is transferred to 
the “private domain of the State”. The government can also 
decide to designate some forest to be “public domain”, such as 
it is the case in Gabon and DRC for protected areas – even 
though, strictly speaking, the public domain should be put at the 
disposal of the public – which is not the case with most 
protected areas. 
In Ghana, all forest lands are held in trust by the Government, 
which manages them for the stool landowners. The forest reserves were gazetted under colonial rule 
to create a permanent forest estate while allowing for the conversion over time of the remaining 
natural forest into other land uses (Lund et al., 2012). In Liberia, at first, State policy recognized 
customary ownership as full ownership rights, whether or not formally titled. It now recognizes only 
usufruct rights of possession and use of undocumented customary claims. This policy has permitted 
the State to grant concessions for vast tracks of customary lands, as well as to create national parks 
and reserves. During the civil war, a new national forestry law was passed, decreeing that forest 
resources (trees), as distinguished from forest lands, belong to the state (USAID, 2010). 
Forest concessions are an important tool for 
sustainable forest management (SFM), 
especially considering that the majority of 
forests in tropical countries are public. 
Forest concessions for timber production 
have been the primary means of allocating 
harvesting rights for tropical forests in 
developing countries, as well as in several 
developed countries with temperate and 
boreal forests.   
There are many concerns about forest 
concessions, which appear to have a bad 
track record, particularly in a number of 
tropical/developing countries. However, 
good examples of forest concessions do 
exist, often as individual initiatives of forest 
companies or communities rather than for 
whole countries.  
Some past failures of forest concessions can 
be overcome through critical modifications 
in the design of the concession system. 
These and other objective and context-
specific changes can be incorporated into 
new and different forest management 
agreements.   
Well-managed public forest concessions 
have the potential to sustainably deliver 
both direct and indirect environmental and 
social benefits to neighbouring populations 
as well as to society as a whole. Besides 
helping to maintain forest coverage and 
providing services such as water storage and 
climate regulation, forest concessions can 
play an important role in structuring and 
managing the conservation units where the 
concession process takes place, through 
reinforcement of governmental presence in 
those areas and legalization of land 
ownership in the region. Better, more 
equitable and transparent forest concession 
systems in public forests can contribute to 
creating and strengthening forest-based 
economies capable of generating benefits at 
the local and regional levels – i.e. an 
inclusive, sustainable forest-based economy.   
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Although the distinction between “national domain” and “private domain of the State” is clear in the 
law in francophone countries, the administrative practices do not translate it into the facts, and 
tended to consider all the forests on the national domain as “Government’s lands”, disregarding local 
occupation and use rights.  
The forest legislation added another layer on the legal land status, by designating forests according 
to their planned uses. The instrument for such designation is the “gazetting” (“classement” in 
French). In an ideal scheme, all gazetted forests should form the “permanent forests”, also called 
“permanent forest estate” or “domaine forestier permanent”. Gazetted forests can be for production 
or protection.  
The use of the two instruments, titling and gazetting, has rarely followed a clear line of distinction. 
Since forests were generally controlled by the forest service in virtue of the “forester regime” that 
restricted the use rights, the fact they were not formally owned by the State inasmuch they were not 
titled was often overlooked by the administration. Gazetting is used in Cameroon not only to allocate 
the forest in the permanent forest estate but also to title it to the name of the State. This is possible 
only because in Cameroon’s legal framework, permanent forests are also private domain of the State 
– or of a local council (see Box 1), but such a situation is a matter of choice and it is possible to 
foresee permanent forests under communal property, even if no country has gone this way so far.  
 
Box 1:  Framework of the forest land status in Cameroon 
A zoning process, normally, should have essentially the objective of determining which land should be kept as 
forest land on the long-term, whatever is their legal status – present or anticipated (since several Forest 
Management Units - FMU/concessions are still not officially gazetted and assigned to the permanent forest 
estate). In Cameroon, the CFs are outside the permanent forest estate, in spite of the initial governmental 
project, but it is not the only solution that can be adopted. 
 
 
In Congo, the “Forest Policy Document” discussed in the Government for two years points out to the 
absence of gazetting for the FMU (which are the basis of the industrial concessions). Since the lands 
concerned are not titled either, one can see that there is a long way to go for achieving the rule of 
law in the forest sector in many countries. 
Land vocation as 
suggested by the zoning 
plan 
PERMANENT FOREST ESTATE 
(Gazetted forests or forest 
awaiting to be gazetted) 
 
NON PERMANENT FORESTS 
(“agro forestry mosaic strip” along roads part 
of the National Estate) 
Administrative naming DOMANIAL FORESTS 
LOCAL COUNCIL 
FOREST 
COMMUNITY 
FOREST OTHER FORESTS 
Juridical status 
Private 
property of 
the state 
Private property 
of the local council 
Sub-division of 
the National 
Estate 
(National Estate, private 
forests) 
Attribution 
Production 
forests, 
protection 
forests, etc. 
Production 
forests, protection 
forests, etc. 
Local 
management 
under the 
supervision of 
the Forest 
Service 
Allotted forests (private 
properties) or awaiting 
being allotted 
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C. Sub-regions and countries' profiles in brief 
In this report focusing on West and Central Africa we selected 9 countries in which industrial forest 
concessions have an economic importance and a social significance. This does not mean that forest 
concessions do not exist also in other countries of the region, but they are, or they have become, 
marginal. On the other hand, there are forest concessions in other parts of Africa, notably in 
Mozambique, but it is outside the scope of this study.  
The profile here presented provide information related to forest cover, estimates of deforestation by 
the Forest Resources Assessment (FRA) of FAO and of tree losses by Global Forest Watch (GFW), 
economic weight of the forest sector in the national economy and elements of context helpful to 
frame the analysis of the concessions. Complementary information can be found in the comparative 
table in appendices. 
Although it is well known by experts that FRA and GFW do not monitor the same things, the 
important discrepancies between the two sources is such for several countries selected that we 
decided to present the estimates in parallel, and also because GFW interface allows to select 
different “tree cover threshold”6, which is an important feature to get a better understanding of the 
forestry context in countries such as the Central African Republic or Côte d’Ivoire. 
I. Increase of forest cover losses in the two sub-regions 
According to GFW data, the rate of forest cover losses is increasing both in Central and West Africa 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1:  Gross tree cover loss in Central Africa 
 
                                                            
6 Tree cover thresholds (per area unit) are key criteria for defining “forests”, and in for countries harbouring various types of 
forests, adopting  threshold of (10%, 30%, 50% or 75%) modifies considerably the area o forest and, from there, the figures 
of deforestation. Throughout this document we will provide the threshold associated with the figures of forest cover and 
deforestation.   
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Figure 2:  Gross tree cover loss 2001-2014 per country in Central Africa  
 
Source: GFW – Forest cover threshold: 30% 
 
In Central Africa, 80% of tree cover losses are attributable to the DRC (Figure 1a), while in West 
Africa, Côte d’Ivoire is the most affected by deforestation (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Gross tree cover loss in West Africa 
 
Source: GFW – Forest cover threshold: 30% 
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II. Countries in brief 
Cameroon 
Estimates of forest cover vary from 17 million ha (GFW, threshold of 75% tree cover) to 18.81 million 
ha (FRA 2015) of forest area7. With respect to timber, Cameroon is now the first exporter in volume 
(roundwood equivalent) of West and Central Africa. The formal industry produces around 2.2 million 
m3 of wood per year, with the bulk exported as sawnwood and although there is still a significant 
proportion of log exported (having increased since the log export ban in Gabon). Net deforestation is 
estimated at 220,000 ha per year between 2010 and 2015 by the FAO (FRA 2015) but GFW indicates 
a much less figure (around 60-70,000 ha of tree cover loss annually for a 10% threshold, and 15-
30,000 for a 75% threshold) (Figure 4). As in the case of Gabon, deforestation tends to increase due 
to the development of permanent crops (oil palm, rubberwood) by both large corporations and mid-
size farmers, adding to the deforestation caused by small-scale farmer cultivating food crops. 
Deforestation is important in the western and centre parts of the country, while the far east, less 
populated and quite landlocked, is also less deforested. 
The contribution of the forest sector (hunting excluded) to the GDP is around 2.75 % and 3.75 % for 
the non-oil GDP (CIFOR, 2014). The number of employees in the formal timber industry is 22,000 and 
an estimated 44,000 for artisanal (informal) timber. The informal timber sector mobilizes an almost 
comparable volume to the formal industrial sector (around 2 million m3 annually, against around 2.7 
million m3 estimated in 2013 for the formal industrial sector). Although most concessions have a 
management plan, the effective implementation of those plans is questioned and stakeholders 
foresee many abandoned concessions by their initial beneficiaries in the next future. 
Figure 4: Tree cover losses in Cameroon (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
Several ambitious forest reforms took place in Cameroon who introduced the first “new generation” 
forest code in 1994. The experience with community forestry was pioneer in Central Africa, but the 
overall outcome is considered disappointing (Cuny, 2011). Cameroon attracted attention in the 
1990’s and 2000’s for its endeavours to reform the allocation system of concessions and the fiscal 
regime. The amount of receipts increased significantly with the mechanism for setting the annual 
area fee through auctioning, although an uncompleted reform agenda prevented further progresses, 
and promises of synergies between fiscal instruments and better forest management remained 
unfulfilled. In spite of these initial interesting achievements, it seems that, for several years, the 
                                                            
7 For a 30% threshold of forest cover, GFW indicates an area of 31 million hectare, a figure extremely different from FRA 
2015. However, when aggregating “forests” and “other wooden lands” categories, the area calculated from FRA 2015 data 
is of 31.5 million ha. 
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policy priority is no more with forestry and the Government promotes actively the development of 
agribusiness, thus lagging behind to complete the legal procedures to gazette the forest concessions 
(Ongolo, 2015). The attempt to create a large “conservation concession” in the Ngoyla-Mintom area 
(around 870,000 ha), a primary forest initially designed for logging but never allocated, failed in 2013 
when the Ministry of Forests decided to launch a bidding process on the area. Finally, after several 
governmental about-turns, only half of the area has been allocated and the fate of the remaining 
part is still pending (Ongolo and Karsenty, 2015). 
Cameroon has been one of the first countries to sign up a FLEGT/VPA with the EC. Three difficulties 
are currently faced by the country to export timber with “FLEGT authorizations”: the first is that the 
VPA encompassed also the domestic timber market, which is dominated by informality (and is 
technically illegal); the second is that the technical firms having attempted to design a national 
verification and traceability system with the administration failed to produce a workable system. 
Finally, with the importance taken by “conversion timber” (forest converted for oil palm production) 
which sometimes occurs with administrative authorizations but on part of the legally established PFE, 
there are big question marks on the legality of such timber.  
Congo (Rep. of) 
From a forestry perspective, Congo, a 4.3 million inhabitant’s country, is usually considered as a dual 
nation. The north of the country is landlocked, with large forests in which the sapelli is the most 
exploited species, and the south, a forest more fragmented in which okoumé (Aucoumea klaineana) 
is the most exploited species, with lower transport costs. Two-thirds of the forest is located in the 
north, where large (up to 1.9 million ha) European-owned concessions are dominating, and almost 
one-third is located in the south of the country, where Asian, Congolese and European companies 
are present, with a dominance of Asian ones (who are controlling de facto the smaller Congolese 
companies). Certified companies are concentrated in the north, while none can be found in the 
south, reflecting the largely unregulated situation of the region which has been affected in some 
parts by political troubles in the recent past. 
The forest cover is about 22.3 million ha (FRA 2015), although GFW estimates indicate a forest cover 
of about 21 million with a cover threshold of 75%. The net deforestation has been on average around 
14,500 ha per year (0.1%) during the 2010-2015 period, while GFW provides highest figures of 
around 35-40.000 ha of forest tree losses for the same period (30% threshold) (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Tree cover losses in Congo (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
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ha are flooded forests). The 15 protected areas cover 3.7 million ha, but many of them are ill-
managed and subject to poaching. 
According to GFW, the forest sector represents around 1% of the GDP but a 2006 economic audit of 
the forest sector performed in 2006 indicated a contribution of 5% and of 10% against the non-oil 
GDP (Bravi et al., 2006). The forest industry employs between 10,000 – 12,000 workers. Although the 
Government seeks actively to promote wood processing – there is a law requesting each company to 
transform 85% of its log production – there is still more than one third of the timber produced 
exported as logs, and its share recently increased as a possible consequence of the Gabonese log 
export ban. The artisanal sector is, overall, not very important but with locally significant impacts in 
the southern region around Pointe-Noire. 
Congo is engaged in both FLEGT and REDD+ processes. As in Cameroon, the country faces serious 
difficulties for setting up a national verification and traceability system. REDD+ raised initially high 
expectations, but signs of disappointments about financing were perceptible in the last years, and 
the Government seeks actively to attract foreign investors to develop the agribusiness. The country is 
currently in the process of enacting a new forest policy and a new forest code. 
DR Congo 
With 152.5 million ha (FRA 2015) or 119 million (GFW, 75% threshold), DRC harbours the largest 
tropical humid forest of Africa. It is also one of the countries with the highest deforestation rates: 
stable annual net deforestation of 311,400 ha in average since 1990 for FRA 2000, tree losses around 
700,000 ha per year (tree cover: 30% threshold) since 2010 for GFW, and with an acceleration of 
losses compared to previous periods (Figure 6).   
Figure 6: Tree cover losses in DR Congo (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
 
DRC is also the most populated country of Central Africa, with around 70 million inhabitants. Internal 
migrations have been important due to the numerous conflicts that are still affecting the eastern part 
of the country. In spite of the impressive forested area, the productive area is limited by the absence 
of infrastructure leading to a heavy reliance on navigable portions of the rivers (primarily the Congo 
River and its tributaries), and by the numerous flooded forests around rivers. DRC is also a “fragile 
State” with extremely low capacities of its administration for managing territories, leading to 
significant discrepancies between the area registered by the ministry for concessions or protected 
areas and estimations through GIS. Yet, forest concessions are officially covering 10 million ha (a 
dozen of concessionaires) while GIS estimates give a figure of 12 million. The same apply for the 
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protected areas: officially, 26 million ha are protected, but the GIS estimates give only 22.6 million 
ha.  
Protected areas are generally not well managed or are ill-managed, while forest concessions, often 
very large but not fully productive, are nibbled by small-scale agriculture, illegal loggers and charcoal 
makers. According to a recent study (Defourny et al., 2011), deforestation in DRC is closely correlated 
with population density – and not with forest concessions or mines. Although announcements of 
mega land deals with agribusiness corporations have been trumpeted some years ago, development 
of oil palm plantations is still modest and forecasters are more circumspect regarding the changes in 
land use for the near future. 
Official forest production is fairly modest (around 300,000 m3 per year, which weight is negligible in 
the GDP) due to the high costs of “doing logging business”, but in the eastern part of the country 
illegal logging is rampant with significant volumes of timber exported to neighbouring countries. To 
supply the large domestic market, the informal artisanal sector mobilises probably more than 3 
million m3 per year, which is ten times the formal production. A moratorium on the allocation of new 
concessions - until transparent procedures for allocation and a national land-use plan is advanced - is 
in force since 2005.  
DRC is engaged in a decentralisation process entailing the transfer of many responsibilities regarding 
management of natural resources to the provinces (11 today, but 26 already created but not 
functional yet), with provincial ministries in charge of the forest created since a couple of years. This 
has led to some confusion in responsibilities, tax collection and monitoring, knowing that the 
capacities of these new provincial ministries are highly heterogeneous.  
The Government is currently discussing with the EC about a possible FLEGT/VPA, even though the 
ambition of establishing timber legality on the full territory appears highly challenging. DRC is often 
considered as fairly advanced in the REDD+ process, even though changes on the field remain to be 
seen. The country benefits from many international funds, including FCPF Carbon Fund, the Forest 
Investment Program (FIP), the Congo Basin Partnership Facility - CBPF (for projects) and, very 
recently, the Central Africa Forest Initiative (funded essentially by Norway so far) from which the DRC 
expects an investment of US$ 250 million up to 2020. 
Gabon 
With a population of around 1.7 million inhabitants, mainly concentrated in urban areas, and an area 
of 26,7 million ha, Gabon is a relatively “empty country” and has an important and dense forest 
cover representing 88 % of its total area. The country is largely covered by concessions, and in 2002 
the Government decided to create 13 national parks covering around 3 million ha, sometimes at the 
expense of some parts of legally attributed concessions.  A national land use plan is ongoing. For a 
tree cover density of 75% (which is the most relevant for a study on concessions), the total forest 
area is about 23 million ha (GFW).  
The deforestation rate is historically very low, reflecting the very limited pressures from a tiny 
number of slash-and-burn farmers. For the same reason, FAO pointed out a net increase of 200,000 
ha of forest in Gabon between 2010 and 2015 (FRA 2015). GFW indicates tree cover losses (for a 30% 
cover) of around 15-18,000 ha between 2001 and 2013 (less than 0.07% annually), and a significant 
increase in 2013 (loss of 40,000 ha) attributable to the development of oil palm and rubber 
plantations by large companies (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7:  Tree cover losses in Gabon (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
The forestry sector contributed US$ 422.2 million to the economy in 2011, which is 
approximately 1.8% of the GDP (Global Forest Watch). However, experts’ evaluation in the beginning 
of the 2000’s (Odyssée Développement, 2005) gave a larger estimate of 3.8% by adopting a broader 
view of the activities generated by forestry. And if the oil sector is excluded, the contribution was of 
6.4% according to the same study. According to the last estimates from the Ministry in charge of 
forestry, the direct employment in the forest sector accounts for around 8,500 employees, a figure to 
which one should add the indirect employment (in transport, trade-related activities…) which may 
represent around 10,000 to 15,000 persons working at least part time for the forestry sector.  
The country is divided in two regions, the (former) “first zone”, a coastal region whose boundaries 
correspond to the navigable parts of the river, and the hinterland, articulated around the railway 
going to the east. The attribution of forest permits in the first zone has been reserved for Gabonese 
national only, leading to widely spread practices of sub-contracting of the concession to active 
loggers (called “fermage”). The first zone is the most degraded, but okoumé’s regeneration is 
dynamic in many places. Gabonese forest is known for the abundance of the okoumé, a light 
demanding species, which is sought after by the veneer and plywood industry. Okoumé’s 
regeneration is difficult in closed forests of the hinterland. There is also a “frontier of the okoumé” in 
the large north-eastern part of the country where the species is not present, making the exploitation 
less attractive for an industry accustomed to rely mainly on this species.   
Concessions have been historically handled by French interests, but Malaysian and Chinese 
companies, working in Gabon since the mid-90’s are now prominent, and Asia is the main outlet for 
the exported timber. Contrasting with the presence of very large concessions, most of the 
concessions are of limited size. A 2007-2013 project funded by the French Aid attempted to 
aggregate these small-sized forest permits (a total area of 2.5 million ha were targeted) but yielded 
very limited results. Many concessions are still without management plans after the expiration of the 
3-years temporary agreement allowing for harvesting while preparing the plan.  
With the log export ban decided in 2010, mid-size operators specialized in log exports, and often 
contractors of Gabonese’ legal concessionaires, have been forced to leave the activity. As explained 
in the report, the timber production has shrunk after the log export ban and Gabon is no more the 
first timber exporter in West and Central Africa.  
Gabon did not show significant interest for the FLEGT process and the VPAs proposed by the 
European Commission. And after having being active within the UNFCCC and COMIFAC at the 
beginning of the REDD+ process, the Government decided to take some distance with the process, 
and focused on a national Climate Plan instead.  
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Central African Republic (CAR) 
Given its climatic contrast, with a dryer northern part and the more humid biomes in the south, 
forests in the CAR are very heterogeneous. FRA (2015) gives an area of 22.3 million ha, while a focus 
on dense forests (75 % threshold in GFW) gives an area of 7 million ha. Concessions are concentrated 
in the south-western part of the country and cover less than 4 million ha for a dozen of active 
concessionaires. Forests in the south-east are too landlocked and not rich enough in commercial 
species; they have never been exploited industrially. Protected areas account for only 247,000 ha. 
Net deforestation is estimated at 15,600 ha annually by FRA (2015), but GFW gives much higher 
figures of 40,000 to 50,000 ha (for a 30% threshold) and almost 20,000 ha for dense forests (75% 
thresholds) (Figure 8). Timber production, dominated by sapelli (Entandrophragma cylindricum), is 
about 700,000 m3 per year, and sawnwood is dominant – although around 120,000 m3 of logs were 
annually exported in average, before the civil unrest hit the country for 2 years. Although modest in 
absolute terms, the forest sector contributes to 6.3% of the GDP and provides 40% to 80% of the 
export receipts (varying annually) (AFD, 2014). The forest sector is also the second formal job 
provider, after the Government, with around 4,000 employees. Informal logging is difficult to 
quantify given the span of the country, and partial estimates give a figure of around 130,000 m3 of 
illegal logs used annually. 
Figure 8: Tree cover losses in CAR (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
 
The CAR has benefited from French support for the timber sector, with a Government’s project 
preparing management plans for the concessionaires. However, the appropriation of such 
management plans by the concessionaires is questionable, and no one is currently certified. 
Given the unstable political situation, CAR lags behinds regarding the FLEGT and REDD+ processes. 
Equatorial Guinea 
According to the FAO, forests cover an area of about 1.58 million ha (FRA 2015) and GFW estimates 
tree cover of 2 million ha (75% threshold). Deforestation is estimated at 11,600 ha annually in 
average for the 2000-2015 period (FRA 2015), and a little below by GFW (Figure 9). The country has 
274,000 ha in protected areas. 
Forest exploitation in Equatorial Guinea is focusing on okoumé, and the sector is dominated for 
almost twenty years by a Malaysian company, a subsidiary of Rimbunan Hijau, for which many 
smaller companies have also commercial links with.  
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Figure 9: Tree cover losses in Equatorial Guinea (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
 
Log export is predominant, although the forest code stipulates that 6% of the production should be 
transformed locally. In 2007, a Presidential decree introducing a log export ban was issued, leading to 
the abandonment of concessions by companies, notably Shimmer. In 2008, the Government decided 
to cancel all the concessions and the productions collapsed (from half a million to 13,000 m3). In 
2009, it was acknowledged that the decree will not be enforced; Shimmer came back and log exports 
(and production) resumed, although with lower volumes. 
Equatorial Guinea became recently a wealthy country thanks to oil discoveries. Forestry is not 
significant in the GDP (around 0.3%) although its impact on employment in remote rural areas is not 
negligible. The country is only participating formally to forestry-related sub-regional or international 
events and information is sometimes difficult to gather, even though the situation improved over the 
past years on that respect.  
Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire, a country highly forested in the 70’s, experienced a severe deforestation the last 30 
years. The dense forest has been lost with the exception of a couple of national parks, notably the 
one in Taï, in the western region. According to GFW, the area covered by dense forest (threshold 
75%) is 511,000 ha. For FRA (2015), the forest area is of 10 million ha and the net deforestation rate 
is insignificant (400 ha/year in average for the 2010-2015 period). For GFW, tree losses are around 
100,000 ha per year (for a 30% threshold) for the same period and were around 10,000 ha for a 75% 
threshold (Figure 10). Some of the differences come possibly from the 231 gazetted forests (forêts 
classées) which represent around 4 million ha, are highly deforested and degraded (although no 
official figure is provided by the Government, field visit and satellite images suggest that only little 
dense forest remains in these areas), but are supposed to be taken over by the forest administration. 
Such takeover and return of the “gazetted forest” to dense forests appears highly unlikely to most of 
the observers, given the perhaps one million farmers settled within these gazetted forests from 
which it is estimated that 20 to 40% of the cocoa produced in Côte d’Ivoire is derived (AFD, 2013). 
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Figure 10: Tree cover losses in Côte d'Ivoire (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
 
Protected areas account for 2.1 million ha, but with the exception of Taï National Park (540,000 ha), 
which is quite well conserved thanks to combined efforts of donors and the Ivorian management, 
these protected areas are also severely degraded and largely deforested.  
The forest industry, once one of the most important in Africa, is rapidly shrinking, and survives 
essentially by targeting gallery forests and trees outside forests. It employs around 10,000 workers 
and is said to contribute to 1.7% of the GDP. This decline is likely to continue, given not only the 
depleted resource but also the fact that the new forest code (2014) gives the communities and the 
individual farmers the property of trees on their lands (providing they have a land certificate). A new 
relationship between farmers legally owning their trees and wood transformers will gradually be 
established, leading probably to the disappearance of the forest concessions. 
Côte d’Ivoire targets now reforestation, with an objective of reaching 20% of forest cover at national 
level “by 2018” –  without precision on the threshold adopted (with FAO figures, forests currently 
cover almost 30% of the country). In the meantime, Côte d’Ivoire decided to articulate its REDD+ 
strategy on two pillars: encouraging “zero deforestation” private corporation initiatives for the 
agricultural commodities and preparing a national PES program.  
Ghana 
The evolution of the forest cover in Ghana can compare with Côte d’Ivoire, with a parallel decline 
since the 80’s due to the very same main drivers of conversion: cocoa area expansion and other 
perennial crops. For FRA (2015), the forest area of Ghana is 9.34 million ha, with an average 
deforestation rate of 28,400 ha/year for the 2000-2015 period. For GFW, it is of 7 million ha (30% 
threshold) with an average tree loss of 40-60,000 ha/year, and of only 207,000 ha of dense forest 
(75% threshold) (Figure 11). Approximately 1.6 million ha are gazetted as forest reserves. A 2014 
map of canopy cover of forest reserves in Ghana8 showed the degradation and deforestation of 
many of them. 
                                                            
8 “Assessing Forest Reserve Conditions in Ghana through Crown Cover Mapping”: 
/www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/import/downloads/mapping_ghana_forest_reserve_condition___pre_publication_report_dr
aft___july_2014.pdf  
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Figure 11: Tree cover losses in Ghana (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
 
All trees and forests are vested in the president; in other words, they are held by the State in trust for 
the communities concerned. Although this implies that communities’ legal ownership is not affected, 
in practice the State has control over trees and forest resources, even though communities and 
landowners are involved in forest management tasks (Boakye and Baffoe, 2007). Reforms of timber 
rights allocation as stipulated in the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy, most notably competitive 
bidding, have been only enacted and in general not implemented (Lund et al., 2012). 
The forest sector is said to contribute to 3.5% of the GDP, and to employ directly 34,000 workers. 
Other estimates are much higher; for instance, the website of the Ghana Promotion Investment 
Centre9 says: “The formal forestry sector employs about 120,000 Ghanaians with employment pre-
dominantly in log processing industry”, although this figure seems overestimated when comparing 
with countries such as Cameroon and Gabon with a comparable formal timber production. 
Companies holding timber rights consist of smaller logging companies without timber processing 
facilities and larger firms with various forms of processing facilities and vertical integration. Most of 
the domestic and part of neighbouring countries’ demand for lumber is met by the artisanal 
operators (chainsaw lumber). Since 2004, the governments set an AAC level of 2 million m3, to be 
split between gazetted reserve and off-reserve areas. However, Hansen et al. (2012) estimated a 
total timber harvest of 6 million m3, taking into account the entire informal sector, meaning the total 
timber harvest is higher than what is estimated for Cameroon, a country much more forested. For 
Boakye (2015), “the annual average illegal logging for the period 2000-2011 among the formal sector 
in Ghana is estimated at 0.78 million m3 or 104% of the legal harvest”. 
In spite of these estimates, Ghana is generally considered as one of the most advanced countries in 
the FLEGT process and possibly a good candidate for issuing the first FLEGT authorization. The 
FLEGT/VPA signed with the EC does not require the domestic market to be fully included into the 
national verification system. According to the VPA, only “timber products for shipment” must be 
considered under the legality verification system, but “Ghana shall endeavour to verify the legality of 
timber sold on domestic markets” (p. 19 of the VPA). As for REDD+, Ghana prepared its REDD+ 
Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) which was approved in 2010. Ghana’s national REDD+ strategy 
(issued in 2015) will focus on avoided deforestation for the first phase of REDD+ and ambitions to 
significantly reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation by 40% over the next ten 
years. 
                                                            
9 http://www.gipcghana.com/invest-in-ghana/sectors/forestry/investing-in-this-sector.html  
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Liberia 
According to FRA (2015), Liberia has 4.18 million ha of forest, a figure comparable to the one 
provided by GFW for the tree cover at 75% threshold (4 million ha, but 9 million ha at 30% 
threshold). Deforestation is estimated at 30,000 ha/year in FRA (2015), unchanged since 1990, which 
is well below the figures suggested for tree cover losses by GFW (escalating from 20,000 ha in 2010 
to of 142,000 ha lost in 2013) (Figure 12). Protected areas cover almost 1 million ha. 
During the periods of instability and civil conflict from 1980 to 2003, timber became a resource used 
for financing armed fractions, leading to a UN embargo on Liberian timber exports from 2003-2006. 
As a consequence, the activity declined and the timber export that, at the beginning of the 2000’s 
represented 20% of the GDP, fell dramatically. In 2006, the President cancelled all forest concessions 
and the sector benefited from donors, such as the USA and the World Bank, support to reform the 
concession system and to ensure transparency. The industrial production and the exports slowly 
resumed in the past years, but the bulk of the supply on the domestic market is provided by the 
informal sector. The industry employs perhaps 3,000 workers. 
Figure 12: Tree cover losses in Liberia (30% threshold) 
 
Source: GFW 
 
Over one million ha of forest was allocated as “Forest Management Contracts” (long term) and 
“Timber Sale Contracts” (short term) concessions, considered to be state-owned land, i.e. without 
recognition of private or community land title. However, the issuance of large numbers of Private 
Use Permits (PUPs) indicated a different approach to recognition of title in establishing forest 
concessions: the vast majority of PUPs were issued for communally-owned land, represented a de 
facto recognition of community land claims for the purpose of establishing commercial concessions.  
Liberia is member of the FCPF for the REDD+ process and has concluded a FLEGT VPA with the EC. 
D. The forest concessions in West and Central Africa 
I. Industrial concessions 
Initially, under colonial era, Western governments granted concessionaires a given – and generally 
huge – area on which they received privileges to use natural resources as private assets, the trade 
monopoly on resources they gathered, and often the right to levy taxes and use hard labour. After 
the independences, the relationship between private actors and the State evolved into a more 
balanced one (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2001). 
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West and Central Africa have a long history with concessions given the fact the forest land is, 
formally at least, controlled by the government (except Ghana where it remains with the Stools) and 
because of the difficulties of implementing “modern” private property in societies where the 
communitarian dimension of land and forest tenure prevents the development of large-scale 
individual properties. 
Today, there are similarities associated with the weakness of the states, the marginalization of some 
areas and the lack of infrastructure. Companies are in charge of various missions which are normally 
the responsibility of the public sector, from inventories of the forest to social services for the local 
populations. For a long time, concessionaires who received their logging rights from the Government 
have been aware that they had to accommodate with their social environment to avoid conflicts. The 
cornerstone of the interface between concessionaires and populations are the contract specifications 
(cahier des charges). Such specifications were automatically associated with the concession contract 
itself and embodied various requirements such as silvicultural and industrial obligations along with 
social ones. Figure 13 indicates the location of the main concessions in Central Africa, while Figure 14 
and Figure 15 give indications on the location of main concessions in Liberia and in the High Forest 
Zone of Ghana. No map of the “Forest Exploitation Perimeters” (PEF) is available for Côte d’Ivoire 
where there are maps only for the forêts classées, which are not concessions but managed directly 
by the State through a parastatal company. 
 
Figure 13:  A glimpse on forest concession areas in Central Africa 
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Figure 14: Forest concessions in Liberia 
 
Comments from GFW about Fig. 13: “The Liberia logging concessions data set combines the boundaries of 
forest management contracts (FMCs) and timber sale contracts (TSCs), compiled by Global Witness from 
available government and contractual maps” 
Figure 15: Map of Ghana showing high forest zone where concessions are concentrated  
 
Source: Boakye, 2015 
Table 1 is an attempt to quantify the areas covered. While the situation is quite well documented for 
Central Africa, it is certainly more ambiguous for West Africa and some choices have been made: 
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- For Ghana, only the Timber Utilization Contracts (TUCs) have been considered as 
concessions (long term objectives, specific commitments for the concessionaires). 
- For Côte d’Ivoire, only the Périmètres d’Exploitation Forestière (PEFs) of the Rural Domain 
have been considered since the forêts classées are managed by the State through 
SODEFOR. But, as the PEFs cover an area of around 12 million ha mostly without forests, we 
have retained the figure of 700,000 ha which is the best estimate available for forest area 
remaining in the Rural Domain and covered by PEFs. This area is more consistent with the 
estimated formal timber production, which is around 1.1 million m3 per year (MINEF, 2014). 
Table 1: Synthesis of the area covered by concessions and areas certified in West and Central Africa 
  
  
Concessions Concessions with a management plan 
Certified concessions 
(FSC or legal timber) 
FSC 
certified 
FSC certified 
as % of all 
conce-ssions 
FSC certified 
as % of 
concessions 
with a 
management 
plan 
Area (ha) Nbr. Average 
area 
(ha) 
Area (ha) % Area (ha) % of all 
conce-
ssions 
Area (ha) % 
% 
Cameroon 7 058 958 111 63 594 5 071 000 72 3 409 593 48 940 945 13 19% 
Congo   12 600 221 51 247 063 4 671 691 37 3 061 243 24 2 478 243 19 52% 
  North 5 822 597 14 415 900 3 504 159 60 3 061 243 52.5 2 478 243 42 71% 
  South 6 777 624 37 183 179 1 167 532 17 0   0  
Gabon   14 272 630 150 95 151 7 181 420 50 2 435 511 17 2 053 505 14 28.5% 
Equatorial  Guinea  740 000 48 15 417        
CAR   3 058 937 11 278 085 3 058 937 100 0   0  
DRC10   12 184 130 80 152 302 0  828 033 7  0  
Liberia   772 740 10 77 000 265 00011 34    0  
Ghana   3 09 63212 60 50 029 767 00013 26    0  
Côte d'Ivoire 700 00014 380  436,000 62    0  
Total 
 
54 389 352 901 
 
23 870 917 44% 8 241 418 15% 5 473 393 10% 23% 
                                                            
10 This does not include around 650,000 ha attributed to 3 Chinese companies in August 2015 by a former Minister in spite of the 
moratorium on forest concession allocation in force since 2002. The newly appointed Minister in charge of the forests  declared in July that 
these allocations will not be legalised  
11 Excerpt from FRA 2015 
12 Ghana has approximately 2.6 million hectares of forest reserve land, of which 1.6 million hectares falls within the so-called High Forest 
Zone. Of these reserves 715,000 hectares have been dedicated for natural timber production, with the remainder under protection and 
plantation development (Source: Implementing the Ghana-EU Voluntary Partnership Agreement: Annual Report 2012). According to an 
analysis made by Global Witness (2013) “The Timber Resources Management Act of 1998, and subsequent amendments, only refer to TUCs 
and Salvage Permits. This clearly suggests that the only legal ways to access timber commercially are through TUCs and Salvage permits”. 
Timber Utilization Contracts (TUCs) for Forest Reserves have a term of 40 years, while TUCs for other lands have a term of five 5 years. In 
this report one considers only TUCs as “concessions”. There were 60 valid TUCs (in and off reserve) according to a list published by the 
Forestry Commission (www.fcghana.org/news.php?news=57) in 2013 for an area of 3 million ha. TUCs in forest reserves represent 2.82 
million ha but there are not fully forest covered . 
13 Excerpt from FRA 2015.  
14 In Côte d’Ivoire, forest exploitation permits (Périmètres d’Exploitation Forestière) in the “rural domain” cover a large area (12 million ha) 
but often without forests. These permits (there are around 380) allows for harvesting trees outside forests. It is estimated (source:  
 Rapport national sur l’aménagement durable des forêts en Cote d’Ivoire suivant les criteres et indicateurs de l’OIBT, 2009) that these 
permits altogether harbour around 700,000 ha of forests, although this figure seems high (and depend upon the definition of forest). One 
company has a management plan covering 436,000 ha. Gazetted forests cover 4.2 million ha (including 212.000 ha of planted forests) but 
are not “concessions” as they are managed by a parastatal enterprise (the SODEFOR). On these “Forêts Classées”, 1.36 million ha are under 
management plan. Although these forêts classées are highly deforested or degraded as it is visible on satellite imagery, no recent estimate 
of the remaining forested area is available. 
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Figure 16: Average size of the Forest Management Units in Central Africa  
 
Source: author, based on GFW data 
 
Figure 16 does not reflect well the concentration of FMUs in the hands of large companies, 
something that Figure 17 does it better. 
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Figure 17: Area concentrated by main concessionaires in Central Africa 
 
Source: Author, based on various sources 
 
In the DRC, the concentration is possibly more important since the Soforma and Sodefor groups have 
the same main shareholder, a Holding called NordSud Timber, based in Liechtenstein and the two 
groups have exchanged FMUs and an industrial unit in a recent past. Some sources15 mention also 
strong commercial ties between Taman, CIBN, SOFIL and the large Malaysian company, Rimbunan 
Hijau. 
If we consider these companies are partners, then we can identify a quartet of companies/partners 
currently exploiting very large areas, as reflected in Figure 18. 
                                                            
15 http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200104230099.html for Taman and CIBN and http://afrique.lepoint.fr/economie/bois-du-congo-l-asie-s-
installe-19-08-2014-1857851_2258.php for Taman and Rimbunan Hijau 
0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000
Sodefor group (Portugal - Liecht.)
Soforma group (Portugal - Liecht.)
Siforco (USA)
ITB (Lebanon)
CIB-Olam (Singapore)
IFO-Danzer (Switzerland)
Rougier (France)
Likouala Timber (Italy)
Vicwood Thanry (China HK)
Asia Congo (China)
Sicofor (China)
CIBN (Malaysia)
Taman (Malaysia)
SOFIL (Malaysia)
Rimbunan Hijau (Malaysia)
Rougier (France)
Sunly (China)
CEB Precious Wood (Switzerland)
Leroy (Lebanon)
CBG (France)
KHLL (China)
CoraWood (Italy)
BSO (France)
Vicwood (China HK))
SEFCA (Lebanon)
IFB (France)
Rougier Sangha Mbaere
Vicwood Thanry (China HK)
Rougier SFID (France)
SEFAC (Italy)
Alpicam (Italy)
Pallisco (France)
Wijma (Netherland)
Shimmer Rimbunan Hijau (Malaysia)
DR
C
Co
ng
o
Ga
bo
n
CA
R
Ca
m
er
oo
n
EQ
G
Hectares:
Forest area attributed 
to main companies (hectares) 
Partnership 
Partnership 
  
 28 
Figure 18: Concentration of areas by commercial partners
 
 
Large foreign companies still dominate forestry in Central Africa. The situation is more balanced in 
West Africa, especially in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, where a majority of companies are African. 
However, the last decade has been marked by the rise of African companies in Cameroon, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and the DRC. There are also a couple of significant Gabonese concessionaires. But, 
these companies are smaller than the foreign ones, and sometimes dependant of some foreign 
companies for the export (e.g. Congolese and Asian companies in southern Congo). 
Social dimensions  
With the relative democratization of West and Central African countries in recent years, the 
multiplication of NGOs and the importance given internationally to the fate of forest-dwelling 
populations, the social dimension of the specifications now tends to prevail. Typically, specifications 
contain provisions for delivering social investments benefiting local populations such as school and 
health care building or equipment, building local roads and bridges to facilitate access to villages, 
boreholes drilling and supplying of building materials to populations. In some cases, provisions are 
more extensive and those who benefit are not only local populations but also provincial authorities, 
local units of ministries in charge of forests and sometimes the central ministry itself.  
Relations between forest companies and local populations are often subject to conflicts, but the 
picture given by damning reports is often one-sided and the issue may not be as simple as once 
thought. The creation of a concession on land also used by populations for agriculture, gathering, 
hunting, fishing and other practices is certainly a recipe for trouble. Yet, the arrival of logging 
companies is often hailed – above all by local populations themselves – as a significant economic 
opportunity in remote and landlocked areas. Potential benefits include direct and indirect 
employment opportunities on an individual basis and a range of socio-economic benefits to be 
negotiated with the company on a collective basis. Demands and expectations of local populations 
usually cover the following elements (CED, 2008): 
• Medicine and equipment of health care centres; 
• Contribution to local education through building or funding schools; 
• Employment and training for young men from riparian villages;  
• Distribution of food and beverage, frequently referred to as cadeaux (presents);  
• Construction or maintenance of roads; and 
• In some cases, provision of additional public infrastructure such as electricity and wells. 
Several large Central African concessions have reached agreements with conservation NGOs to 
enrich management plans with a section on wildlife management including measures deemed 
“conservative and repressive” by Doucet et al. (2002). These include hunting management plans with 
authorization to hunt on foot in the vicinity of settlements of forestry employees, the ban on hunting 
in work places and on bushmeat transport, etc. 
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Two other factors explain this evolution of specifications and the growing importance of social issues 
in concession-related activities: 
• The implementation of long-term forest management plans that settle down concessionaires 
to a given territory;  
• The development of forest certification in Central Africa. 
Social provisions in specifications and some examples 16  
Specifications vary with national regulations, but it is frequent to find provisions for the below items. 
Some also provide examples of actions undertaken by companies, as illustrated below. 
Housing for employees, with water and electricity supply. One particular question for the 
companies is the perimeter of delivery, namely whether the target population should be the 
entire neighbouring villages or whether it should be limited to company staff and their 
immediate families. 
For example:  
– In Cameroon, Pallisco decided to deliver electricity with half a dozen generators, but 
only to its employees living in a camp built near the small town of Mindourou. The 
same situation prevails for water: a fountain is available for the workers, but not for 
the inhabitants of Mindourou.  
– Wijma also has a tap with clean water theoretically for all its workers at its base in 
Ma’an, although most of the company’s workers are accommodated at the entrance to 
one of the company’s concessions, i.e., between 20 and 50 km away from town. 
However, Wijma provides electricity for six hours a day to the entire town of Ma’an, 
although again because of the town’s remote location the generator goes unrepaired 
for weeks or end if it breaks down.  The company has also built a waste disposal unit 
(albeit for its own waste rather than that of the town of Ma’an) and established a 
partnership with organizations specialised in recycling. 
Schools for local population. School building and equipment, health care and sports facilities 
(mainly football pitches) form the bulk of social deliveries and are often planned for by contract 
specifications. In some cases, companies decide to hire teachers themselves to complete the 
educational team in existing schools. This often creates tensions between teachers hired by the 
company and others, namely those paid by the government or local council, especially as the 
former are paid higher and more regular wages. 
For example:  
– In Ghana, SAMARTEX is believed to have carried out a range of social deliveries in the 
education sector. The company has been running a nursery school with a capacity of 230 
children since 1995, albeit with only 6 employees. The company also supports a primary 
school with 549 students run by the Ghana Education Service. The costs of the 11 
employees are shared jointly by the company and the Service. SAMARTEX also provides 
material support to a college by sponsoring individual sports equipment, furniture, 
building construction and wages of teachers not paid by the State. Furthermore, 
SAMARTEX supports financially the best students and has designed an internship 
programme oriented towards management which lasts a minimum of 2 years, welcomes 
a dozen of students from the university, and allows the company to recruit skilled 
people. At the end of the programme, the best students are offered a manager’s position 
within the company. In addition, SAMARTEX has created a football club for young people 
as well as the 2,000 employees of the company site in Samreboi. 
                                                            
16 With excerpts from Jégou, Karsenty and Singer, (2008) 
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Health care: The health of employees in forest concessions is affected by a number of infectious 
diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS. In regions with few economic activities, the arrival of a timber 
company tends to attract many immigrants, including prostitution which has been known to 
develop rapidly under such circumstances. Truck drivers commuting between large towns and 
forest sites are vectors of the disease. Beyond legal obligations, companies are directly 
concerned by this situation which also has a significant impact on their own labour force. Skilled 
employees with higher wages and thus disposable income are particularly exposed to contract 
HIV, an issue which thus affects directly the companies’ interests. 
For example:  
– In Congo-Brazzaville, CIB is without doubt the most advanced company regarding health 
care. It has its own programme to fight HIV/AIDS which includes regular awareness-
raising campaigns and free condom distributions. The Pokola health centre (locally 
known as the “hospital”) is reputed as being the most efficient of all of northern Congo. 
CIB is the only company equipped for delivering on its own antiviral treatment, tri-
therapy and HIV screening. The centre has two machines to detect T4 lymphocyte loads 
in the blood. The company also claims that the “hospital” is home to an operating 
theatre and latest Dutch material. 8,000 persons currently use the health centre and 
access is not solely restricted to workers and their relatives. Workers are requested to 
bear 15% of the treatment costs. 
Food: One of the deleterious impacts of logging on the forest environment is the increase in 
poaching favoured by road construction for timber transportation. With the sudden 
concentration of workers and their relatives in forested areas, hunting pressure increases 
significantly. In some regions there are signs that wildlife has been seriously depleted, which 
deteriorate the livelihoods of local inhabitants who depend the most on forest products, 
especially Pygmies. To address this issue and control poaching inside concessions, companies 
have begun supplying their workers with sources of protein and some initiatives have been 
undertaken to develop local food production and animal breeding.  
For example:  
– In Cameroon, Wijma has introduced a carrot-and-stick approach to fighting poaching. 
The company claims to have eradicated poaching among its staff with an extremely strict 
policy of firing anybody caught with bushmeat (although some reports confirm that 
timber prospectors often kill and eat wildlife in situ – an activity which is much more 
difficult to monitor). In terms of “carrot”, Wijma has set up a shop (économat) which sells 
chicken, frozen fish and basic foodstuffs (such as oil, rice and flour). Fish and chicken is 
reserved to workers only but according to some employees, prices are high and the shop, 
which is located in Ma’an, is difficult to get to for those who are housed outside town 
near the entrance to the concessions. Wijma has partly solved this issue of long distance 
by providing its staff with a couple of trucks equipped with benches that run along the 
main roads to Ma’an, but these do not run at all times. Once in Ma’an, workers often 
need to find shelter in town for the night before returning home the following day. The 
company is also promoting alternatives to bushmeat among local populations and has 
been organising training workshops on breeding chicken. 
Roads: Road construction and maintenance is a frequent request of populations in forested 
areas. In the near absence of government authorities, villagers look to the companies for this 
type of infrastructure. However, many environmental NGOs point out that roads are associated 
with deforestation and large-scale poaching. National legislation often stipulates that temporary 
roads must be closed once logging activities are finished in a given area, which often goes against 
the will of local populations. Companies have thus struck various kinds of compromise between 
these two contradictory requests. In Congo-Brazzaville, for instance, CIB maintains main roads 
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after the end of logging activities, whilst secondary axes are only maintained if specific villages 
benefit from it. 
Working conditions: Rougier’s companies in Gabon, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville carried out 
a risk analysis for each type of job. In the Gabonese company (ROG) workers wear “IPE 
equipment” (Individual Protection Equipment) and security staff check the proper use of the 
equipment on each site. Security training (first aid, tackling fires…) is also part of company policy. 
A vehicle is said to be available full time for evacuation. In Gabon, CEB has a training programme 
for workers covering risks linked to felling trees and fires in the wood processing unit. 
Whilst the situation has undoubtedly improved in some large companies – especially those which 
have undertaken a certification process – (Box 2), limited information is available for medium-sized 
enterprises and a number of large companies. In addition, subcontracting for logging and other risky 
and dangerous operations is quite common, yet these employees have yet to benefit from the same 
improvements in working conditions that fully-fledged staff of many concessionaires now enjoy.  
Box 2: Two socially advanced companies in Gabon and Congo 
In Gabon, CEB-Precious Wood has spent around USD 3.4 million in social investments since 2001. This 
encompasses: 
-  Building houses for the employees and their families, but also the teachers assigned in “CEB school” by the 
government 
-  Distributing mills for cassava 
-  Building and maintaining schools and health centre  
-  Provide generators, etc. 
Agriculture has also been developed jointly with local farmers through pilot plantations of cocoa and bananas 
granted to village associations later on. For the primary school, up to 600 children are trained. The company 
discusses with the academic authority the skills of the assigned teachers. Certification auditors compare the 
results of the “CEB School” with other schools of the region. The company provides also busing for students 
through a contract with a transport company.  
In Congo, the CIB-Olam (formally French, German, Danish, then taken over by Olam in 2011), has been 
requested by the Government to ensure food security for employees and their relatives, which amounts to 
sustaining a large part of Pokola’s town (14,000 inhabitants). Several agricultural projects have thus been 
undertaken. One such project called PROGEPPP involves breeding programmes for a number of animals such as 
snails, pork, duck, etc. Attempts to develop cattle breeding amongst the wider population have also been 
made, but it resulted in failure, and projects to breed smaller animals have also met with mitigated results. This 
is mainly due to the fact that there is no tradition of breeding within these local populations which are 
traditionally oriented to hunting and gathering.  
One of the originalities of CIB’s actions is the widespread use of a GPS by the Mbendjele to identify trees and 
forest sites that are important to them to prevent them from being logged, such as hunting and foraging 
grounds, water sources, burial places, sacred sites and sites of economic and cultural value. This initiative was 
related in an article in Nature by M. Hopkins in July 2007 (vol. 448, pp. 402-403) as follows:   
[Anthropologist J. Lewis, committed by TFT,] designed a set of electronic icons to help the Mbendjele record 
the locations of important sites using a portable, palm-pilot-style device. The simple pictorial menu allows the 
pygmies to identify different types of sites as they wander through the forest; the sites are then automatically 
plotted onto a computerized map with GPS. The Mbendjele choose from four categories to classify their 
important sites: hunting, gathering, social/religion and farming. From there, each category branches off into 
more specific details. For instance, to signify the importance of a sapelli tree, one would select ‘gathering’ and 
then ‘caterpillars’ from the next list of choices. Similarly, the system can log areas where yams grow, where 
herbal medicines are found, and where the Mbendjele camp while travelling through the forest. The results can 
easily be plotted on a piece of mapping software such as Google Earth. And the pygmies know the terrain so 
intimately that they have no problems visualizing it as depicted from a birds-eye view on a map. 
The situation of CIB vis-à-vis its social surrounding is comparable to the practices of large industrial firms in the 
19th century in Europe, where many aspects of social life were determined by the company itself. CIB has built 
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houses and claims to house its employees and their families free of charge. Materials used today are of better 
quality and bricks are gradually replacing wood.  
Yet so far only 600 employees have benefited from this measure and twice this number is still waiting to be 
housed in similar conditions. Houses are supplied with electricity and running water. For those who have not 
yet been granted a house, CIB has built new water access points for 7,000 inhabitants which is roughly the 
number of workers and relatives entitled. Despite the specifications set by the Government mentioned above, 
the company is reluctant to go beyond these existing measures and providing for the rest of Pokola’s 
population. In its defence, CIB representatives say the company is unwilling to act as a “substitute to the 
Government”. In fact, CIB is already largely a substitute to the Government in many respects: in his paper on 
the role of CIB in Pokola. Carret (1998) described how the company owned most public facilities in town in the 
1990s, including a jail. By using this argument today, the management is aware of the growing financial cost of 
these demands and try to bound the expenses. 
II. The debate on the negative impacts of concessions 
At the beginning of the 21st century, forest concessions were in a state of flux. One does not discuss 
here the critique of “conservationists” (scientists and conservation NGOs) related to logging in 
natural and ancient forests since logging can be practiced apart from the concession system. There is 
also a specific criticism against industrial logging, which draw a line between an alleged sustainable 
logging that is (or could) be practiced by communities and an industrial logging associated with the 
concessions, allegedly unsustainable as it requires heavy equipment (bulldozers, etc.). This assertion 
seems to be based on common sense, but existing community forests where logging is practiced in 
Central Africa do not have convincing records with respect to the quality of forest management, as 
several reports have stated (see Box 3).  
In Central Africa, some authors argue that concessions have failed to reduce poverty (see Counsell, 
Long, & Wilson, 2007). This argument has some consistency when one sees the poverty in forest 
areas and compare with the, sometimes, strong economic impact of oil or gas extraction for the local 
populations, in terms of potential of redistributed royalties (providing the governments adopt an 
active policy to ensure redistribution). But it is also known that reliance on highly valued natural 
resources when the institutions are weak often leads to what is called the “resource curse”. Yet, one 
can wonder whether the critique of the forest concessions is specific to the concessions or can apply 
to any extractive industry in a context of ineffective / weak institutions. In addition, the benefits 
made by forest concessionaires (i.e. what could be redistributed) cannot compare with the potential 
benefits yielded by the mining activity or oil extraction (when prices are good). It is usual to see 
companies declaring negative financial results at the end of fiscal exercises – even though it is also 
known that there are various means to reduce the apparent benefits, including transfer pricing. But 
different signs suggest that many forest concessions in West and Central Africa are not that 
profitable, at least for those who comply strictly with the public regulations (and, for some of them, 
with the additional requirements of forest management certification) as many forest concessionaires 
are seeking more or less actively buyers for their concessions, and the recent withdrawals of big 
players (Olam in Gabon, Danzer in DRC, DLH in Congo…) tend to indicate that this is not an easy or 
highly profitable business.  
The emphasis on public and private actors, often at the expense of local populations, and the 
growing nongovernmental sector has been a strong target of criticism. Critics have not only pointed 
to the theory of concessions but have relied on a wealth of historical evidence to support their views. 
Indeed, examples abound where local populations were marginalized and/or abused within 
concession-based systems, such as in Coquery-Vidrovitch’s (2001) account of concessions in French 
colonial Africa in the early 20th century. 
Concession-based systems are often picked up on the idea that rights and responsibilities are 
delegated from the public to the private sector. This is where the large size of concessions in Central 
Africa comes into play: although justifiable from an economic viewpoint, this aspect is often used to 
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put forward the image of concessions as a relic of colonialism from a historical perspective. Thus, 
large forest concessions have been often portrayed as “states within the State,” even though in many 
countries the concessionaires are unable to oppose the more and more evident governmental policy 
choices in favour of agribusiness, sometimes impinging well-established forest concessions, not 
speaking of mines and oil extraction. 
Concern for the well-being and interests of local populations only came to the forefront of 
discussions on forest management since the late 1980s, with the growing popularity of community-
based (rather than State-led) development ideas. At the same time, the nongovernmental sector 
grew exponentially in size, leading to the staggering array of environmental, social and advocacy 
NGOs that colour the political landscape of forestry today. These NGOs not only defended the 
interests of communities, but also argued for an official role for themselves in forest management. 
And it is a matter of fact that large forest concessions can prevent the development of self-
administered community forest, at least given the current prevailing conception of the community 
forestry and industrial concessions as two mutually exclusive land tenure entities. But this is 
currently beginning to change, and this report provides recommendations to deepen and give a 
better consistence to this process.  
On the other hand, the social demand for community forests (designed as community concessions, 
see next section) is variable across countries, and often the demand is for agricultural land, not for 
forest to be managed on a communal basis. Attitudes of the local population vis-à-vis the industrial 
concessions are ambivalent: perceived as potential competitors for some resources, they are also 
seen as opportunities for getting various economic and social advantages (Joiris and Bigombe-Logo, 
2010). Therefore, relationships are still “in tension”, where the renegotiation of previous agreements 
reached is also favoured by the sometimes fragile internal cohesion of the communities that gives 
opportunities for individual one's upmanship.  
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Box 3: Small-scale enterprise as alternative to industrial concessions? 
In an IIED Discussion Paper focused on Guyana’s forest sector, Mendes and Macqueen (2006) suggest the 
promotion of small and medium enterprises alongside the use of “portable technology” as an alternative to 
large-scale concessions and an “industry (…) concentrated on high volumes, low revenue primary products such 
as logs or large sawn baulks” (p. 18). They advocate less “vertical integration” and more “specialisation” that 
could bring more value-added to the timber production. One knows that small-scale logging and processing 
generates much more work than large industries concerned by productivity gains. But could such a “small-scale 
strategy” work for West and Central Africa, where vertical-integration and large-scale concessions are going 
hand-in-hand?  
Currently, portable technology is used by chainsaw loggers to make wood boards sold mainly on the local 
market, and sometimes exported. Such activity has 3 characteristics: 
- The forest is more high-graded by chainsaw loggers than large concessionaires. As underscored by specific 
studies in Cameroon, DRC and Congo (Cerutti and Lescuyer, 2011; Lescuyer, Cerutti et al., 2014; Lescuyer, 
Yembe-Yembe and Cerutti, 2011), small-scale loggers concentrate on higher value species, since they are 
mobile and can look for a bundle of species without the spatial constraints entailed by a forest management 
plan. This is contradictory with the efforts aiming at reducing the pressure on highest value species (which are 
generally over-exploited) and a shift towards less-used species. This shift is being tried by several industrialists 
constrained by the reduced AAC entailed by the implementation of forest management plans, and further 
accentuated by the certification requirements. 
- In addition, recovery rates are low (Cerutti and Lescuyer, 2011), since the main difference with the 
industrial wood processing is the making of the board in the forest with the chainsaw itself (very low recovery 
rate) or with a mobile saw (such as Lucas Mills). In the last case, the recovery rate on the main product (the 
standard sized FAS board) can compare with the industrial one, but there is no use of by-products (from the 
“wastes”) which makes all the difference between the common recovery rate of 30-35% and a 50-60 % 
corresponding to the combination of main-standard size board and by-products such as non-standard board, 
moulding, pieces for flooring, etc. Let’s add that veneer peeling industry needs logs transport and is not 
compatible with portable technology. In countries such as Cameroon, CAR, Congo and DRC, more investments 
in veneer peeling industry would help diversify the range of harvested species in response to the reduced AAC 
on managed forest. 
- Due to loopholes into the legal frameworks in West and Central Africa, illegal is, in general, synonymous 
with informal. That means that small-scale loggers escape many of the formal taxes – even though they are 
pressured with non-official taxation by the official agents – and are outside of the salary system (no social 
insurance, etc.). Such a situation could be reversed, but it would need a radical change in public policies and 
also a substantial decrease in corruption which plagues the administrative system from the top to the lowest 
level. 
Since most of the forest sector in West and Central Africa is export-oriented, with a significant part of the 
production (in value) still going to Europe, the issue of “environmental norms” – which includes legality 
requirement – should not be underestimated. And small-scale logging and processing is, currently, unable to 
meet these escalating requirements. Admittedly, these current handicaps can be overcome in the future 
thanks to pro-active training and technical support policies, combined with a complete reorganisation of the 
credit system and a radical change in the law and administration practices, and there are certainly valuable 
policy actions that ought to be undertaken without delay, but one knows that willingness for reforming is not 
always evident in Africa. 
We can also add that to promote small-scale entrepreneurship, one needs entrepreneurs. And here the 
country situation is contrasting. In Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, most of Cameroon and in some parts of Congo, there is 
such a potential; but in northern Congo, CAR, Gabon and in many parts of DRC, the density of the social and 
economic activity and capital is low. Small-scale enterprises are not very adapted to landlocked, low population 
density, remote markets and high transportation costs, and it is difficult to imagine that governments would 
give up the benefits (fiscal, induced development effects…) granted by the large concessions. Then, a realistic 
agenda would focus more on helping the small-scale sector to be “decriminalized” and getting more efficient to 
complement the large scale industry (especially for supplying domestic markets) than to believe they could be 
an alternative in the short term – and even to longer term in certain areas. 
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III. Community forestry under concession regime 
Community forests are often organized on the model of the concession, with exclusive area for 
exploitation of a given resource and specifications.  Cameroon stands for the oldest experience of 
institutionalized community forestry in Africa (since the end of the 1990s). The outcomes are not 
convincing, due, on one hand, to all the red tape imposed by the administration, and, on the other, 
of the difficulties of collective action in Cameroonian villages (Cuny et al., 2004, Vermeulen et al., 
2006; Julve et al., 2013). Corruption prevailing in the country is an aggravating factor. Gabon has also 
allowed for community forestry since 5 years, but only three community forests have been 
recognized so far. Here too, difficulties of collective actions are reported in villages, in which 
individualism is important. The Forest Code under preparation in the Republic of Congo would allow 
for community forestry, but specific modalities are still to be decided. Other countries (e.g. 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana…) have specific categories of tenure resembling community forestry, but 
without specific privilege of exploitation for a given resource; therefore, they cannot be considered 
as concessions. 
As opposed to Latin American countries where indigenous communities are socially recognized and 
settled on specific territories, the so-called indigenous peoples in Central Africa are much less 
numerous and were until recently not recognized politically as a distinguishable component of the 
“national community” (Bahuchet et al., 2001). In Latin America, this better recognition has led 
sometimes to recognize ownership rights to communities. This was not, and is still not, a policy 
option endorsed by governments in Central Africa. 
With recent evolutions in the international regime of indigenous peoples at the UN, the political 
attention paid to indigenous communities is gradually changing, notably in Congo (Rep.) where the 
Government decided to address the issue in high-visibility meetings. The Pygmies-related 
communities themselves were reputed “nomadic” or, at least, not attached to specific territories. 
This also has changed gradually and more territorial relationships have been established in that 
respect. But the situation of “subalterns” faced by many Pygmies communities in their social 
relations with their Bantu villager’s neighbours (Bahuchet, 1993) has not facilitated the emergence of 
indigenous community forestry.   
The UK-based NGO Rainforest Foundation and its local partners have already mapped thousands of 
hectares of “customary territories” (including Bantus) throughout the Congo Basin 
(www.mappingforrights.org/). Within the framework of forest management certification, some 
companies (e.g. the CEB-Precious Wood in Gabon) have started mapping the customary territories 
overlapping the industrial concessions (see Figure 19) and using such maps as a key for benefits 
sharing, with local investments decided jointly with communities and proportionate to the area of 
customary territory overlapping the industrial concession.  
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Figure 19: Maps of the "finages" (customary territories) overlapping with the CEB Precious Wood 
concessions (Gabon)  
 
Source: TEREA and Precious Wood 
 
A new generation of forest regulations calls for benefits sharing with “riparian” populations 
(Cameroon, Gabon), and/or for establishing “community development series” within the industrial 
concessions (Congo).   
The “Community Development Series” 
The “community development series” (SDC) implemented in concessions with management plans in 
Congo (in the northern region, so far into 9 FMUs) are limited areas around villages within the 
concessions which have been mapped during the preparation of the plan (Schmitt and Baketiba, 
2015). These areas are defined with respect to the number of inhabitants and the importance of 
agricultural activity. In the FMU Pokola in the CIB concession, these SDC represent 6% (26,950 ha) of 
the FMU area. In another concession (Mokabi – Rougier group), the SDC represents 1.9 % (10 934 ha) 
of the FMU (Figure 20). These SDC have been created by a regulatory text in 2007 and are part of the 
forthcoming new forestry law. 
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Figure 20: Community development series in the Mokabi (Rougier Group) FMU in Congo (Rep.) 
Source: FRM and Mokabi (Rougier Group)  
 
In those areas, villagers are allowed to develop agricultural activities, hunting and timber harvesting 
for local needs (that means, commercial hunting and logging are prohibited), breeding, etc. The area 
is not an “enclave” within the concession since the company can still exploit timber there but it has 
agreed with the communities a payment of 1,000 FCFA (USD 1.7) for each cubic-meter harvested in 
the area - and up to double that amount for certain species, as in the case of CIB-Olam. In one 
concession, the payment is delivered in cash to the villagers; in another one it is transferred to a 
“Development Communitarian Fund” (FDL) for financing small projects chosen by the villagers17. FDLs 
are supervised by a “Concertation Committee” whose composition is fixed by administrative 
regulation with all the “stakeholders” (including all local administrative authorities). They are funded 
by a mandatory contribution of 200 FCFA (USD 0.35) for each cubic-meter harvested annually on the 
entire FMU. 
Initially, those funds have been decided as a response to the request of the certifying bodies, and it 
has been expanded through different regulatory documents and as part of the FLEGT legal 
framework in Congo. A couple of studies have been devoted to these FDL (Morand, 2013; Barros 
2013; Rickenbach, 2013), which detail the difficulties for using these funds to promote a sustainable 
local development. Difficulties are related to the capacity to design realistic and sustainable small 
projects (and projects are often imposed by the administrative authorities or, at least, strongly 
suggested), resulting in a limited absorption capacity of the available money. Other difficulties 
include the lack of technical support for agriculture and livestock-raising which has to do with what is 
referred to as  “collective action”, the capture by the local “elites” of advantages and the frequent 
                                                            
17 In addition to the 200 FCFA (USD 0.35) for each cubic-meter harvested annually on the entire FMU that must be transferred to the FDL 
according to public regulations. 
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failure of projects requesting cooperation of villagers (free-riding and mistrust are frequent). Lastly, 
when no distinction is made between the so-called “villagers” (Bantu people)18 and indigenous 
people (“Pygmies”), the latter are often discriminated in the equipment distribution and other 
advantages. The current trend is to consider distinguishing those project proposals for indigenous 
people and for “villagers” and to try to individualise (at the household’s level) the initiatives/micro 
projects supported by the FDLs (Schmitt and Baketiba, 2015). 
The dual dimension of the community forestry in DRC 
In the DRC, the 2014 decree organizing community forestry paves the way for a dual conception of 
community forestry with the distinction between the “forest of the local community” (that is the 
customary territory that can overlap with industrial concessions) and the “community concession”, 
this latter being potentially a subdivision of the former but associated to an exclusive area 
(Vermeulen and Karsenty, 2014). (Box 4).  
If really managed by the public authorities and by the industrial concessionaires as foreseen in the 
forest code, the concept of "forest of the local community" can be a promising option for benefit 
sharing (communities receiving some portion of the timber revenues proportionally to the share of 
their customary territory encompassed into the industrial concession).  
Towards a revisited conception of the interactions between industrial concessions 
and community forestry  
These dynamics, if deepened and handled by public policies, may trigger a transformation of the 
concession system in Central Africa towards the recognition of overlapping rights associated with 
different “institutional layers” on the same area. The overlapping areas might not only be a key 
element for benefit sharing, but they could also become joint management areas (keeping some 
parts out of the exploitation and for controlling potential encroaching of outsiders) for the 
development of non-timber economic activities in joint ventures between the industrial 
concessionaires and the various communities, and having those overlapping rights recognized by the 
legal frameworks.  
As for community-based concessions, allowing for exclusive rights by moving the industrial 
concession boundaries in order to make room for viable small-scale enterprises might be the second 
part of the case for promoting joint management, associating overlapping and exclusive rights for 
communities. Gazetting of Forest Management Units, not yet completed in Central Africa, could 
provide the opportunity for such moving of boundaries when needed. 
                                                            
18 In reality, the so-called “Bantu” and “Pygmies” are often settled  in the same village, but it is common to distinguish the “villagers” and 
the indigenous people (not really nomadic any more), also called “Pygmies” – a generic name for several ethnic groups.  
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Box 4: Acknowledging and managing the dual dimension of community forestry 
Conceiving all tenure categories on the same plan leads to dead-end discussions and conflicting outcomes on 
the ground, as the possibility of viable community forestry entails a more or less profound dismantling of the 
industrial concession system - an option unlikely to be accepted by governments looking for fiscal receipts, 
exporting industries and structured employment. 
 
A compromise could be if instead of opposing the two dimensions, the stakeholders integrate both the 
customary land tenure (the “forest of the local communities” - the “finage” in Gabon and Cameroon), a 
category that could overlap with other tenure such as the industrial forest concession and protected areas, and 
an institutional innovation (already mentioned as such in the DRC forest law): the community concession. With 
the exception of provisions to avoid private appropriation of the collective heritage by the customary Chiefs, 
there is no need to regulate the customary land tenure (A + B, in the below graph is the finage), but a political 
interest to map and recognise it, notably for co-management of shared resources and benefits sharing – as in 
Gabon and other countries. On the other hand, the community concession would be an exclusive tenure (B will 
be its maximum size1) designed within the finage. Its productive nature would call for an elected body 
accountable vis-à-vis those who have entrusted them for managing a collective enterprise.  
The debate would be much easier if the stakeholders agree on the dual dimension rather than to keep the 
community forestry on a single plan: as the finages are overlapping with other tenure categories, there is no 
need to cap them in surface; on the other hand, the community concessions would be limited by the 
boundaries of the other legal tenure entities, such as the industrial concessions. Boundaries of those last could 
be deemed misplaced and impeding the possibility of a viable community concession; in such a case, 
negotiations could be organised by the forest administration and the provincial authorities to reshape the 
industrial concessions boundaries, existing or planned.  
Overlapping areas could be an opportunity for partnership between communities and the industrial 
concessionaire for developing economic joint ventures based on NTFPs and/or agroforestry, recreational 
hunting, plantations of cash crops in degraded areas and control of the potential outsiders. 
IV. Recreational hunting concessions 
Recreational hunting was practiced during the colonial period in DRC, which was then Zaire. Fifty-
seven concessions were granted to private hunting clubs. There are 19 or so hunting concessions still 
operational, even though they no longer welcome official hunting tourism. It is only in 2003 that new 
hunting concessions were offered for lease, including some of the existing concessions. Three private 
companies were interested in leasing hunting concessions in 8 sectors, totalling a surface of close to 
90,362 km² for a hunting season. Nevertheless, it is difficult to obtain reliable information on the 
nature, the functioning and the results of this activity. 
In Congo, the last and unique private hunting club stopped any tourism activity in 2000. It operated 
near the Nouabalé-Ndoki National Park, on the FMU of Kabo, in the CIB logging concession. This 
company had signed a draft agreement with the Ministry of Forest Economics (MEF), the NGO 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and the CIB, within the management plan of the peripheral zone 
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of the National Park Nouabalé-Ndoki. Yet, hunting activities have been forced to stop since MEF 
stopped giving out quotas for Bongos (a large forest antelope).  
In CAR, 48,621 km² (4.86 million ha) are “domaines de chasse sportive” and an additional 30,134 km² 
(3.01 million ha) are community-managed hunting areas, mostly in the northern part of the country. 
In 1990, in the southwest of the country, three sectors have been assigned for hunting in the Dzanga-
Sangha Reserve, which is a zone of closed rainforest. 
In certain hunting regions, waterside communities received a small portion of the total amount of 
taxes paid by hunting clubs, which was at the most 10 % of the felling tax and 10% of the area tax. 
Furthermore, these taxes are not properly distributed by the government body in charge, and in 
numerous cases the taxes are paid to the villages. The rent is captured at an intermediate level, 
meaning that local populations fail to receive benefits from the hunting tourism industry. The 
feelings of being taken advantage of that arises in such cases, creating opposition against hunting 
clubs (Roulet, 2005). 
But the new trend seems to be the development of recreational hunting in timber concessions. In 
Congo, an agreement, encouraged by the Government, has been concluded between the CIB-Olam 
and a company called “Congo Hunting Safari” for proposing safaris on a portion of the Kabo FMU 
(296,000 ha)19. Another deal is to be concluded soon and could pave the way for an evolution of the 
concession regime with a joint commercial use of different resources overlapping on the same 
territories. 
E. Managing the concessions20 
Management plans are mandatory in all surveyed countries and their implementation should be seen 
a prerequisite for keeping the concession. The reality is far from this principle, and it is very likely 
that a majority of non FSC-certified concessions (or certification of legal sourcing or timber, even 
though less stringent) do not implement fully their management plan and many do not implement it 
at all. Figure 21 provides available data on the area under management plans.  
                                                            
19 Before this agreement, the situation was conflicting since the Government granted safari rights to “Congo Hunting Safari” on a portion of 
the Kabo concession without the agreement of CIB-Olam. This intrusion of Hunting Safari into the FMU led to the suspension of the FSC 
certificate of the FMU and this agreement led to an end of the sanction. 
20 For other details see comparative table in the appendices 
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Figure 21: Area and proportion of concessions with a management plan (in hectares and % of total attributed 
concessions) 
 
For Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, there is no database giving a complete overview of the status of forest 
management, but large societies such as Samartex in Ghana and Improbois in Côte d’Ivoire comply 
with national standards. Samartex is certified for “FSC chain of custody” and Improbois is certified 
“Origine Légale des Bois” (OLB), both being legality and traceability certificates.  
Timber management 
In African moist tropical natural forests, logging is highly selective due to (i) the high diversity of 
species and their heterogeneity with respect to their processing aptitude and market demand, and 
(ii) the high transport costs, often dependent on road operations. In Central Africa, the volume of 
commercial timber extracted rarely exceeds 10 - 13 m3/ha, and is often around 4 - 8 m3 (0.5 tree per 
hectare) – for instance in the DRC. This corresponds approximatively to 4 to 8% of the standing 
volume (all species). The volume damaged is a function of the intensity of the exploitation and the 
implementation of RIL practices (even though these have only marginal effects when extraction rates 
are very low). In average, logging activities damage 7 to 10% of the surface area (Durrieu de Madron 
et al., 2000), which is significantly less than what has been observed in South-East Asia, for instance. 
On the other hand, the low volume harvested generally does not open the canopy enough to allow 
light-demanding species to renew their population. This is an issue, since most of the popular 
commercial species such as sapelli (Entandrophragma cylindricum), okoumé (Aucoumea klaineana), 
ayous/samba/wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon) are light-demanding, and this low rate of tree removal 
does not create favourable conditions for their renewal21. Management plans set targets increasing 
the number of species harvested and the volume extracted, but the actual harvest is still 
concentrated on a handful of well-known species. Few former less-used species have become 
popular in the past 20 years, an exception being the okan (Cylicodiscus gabunensis), a hardwood 
used in water which has been substituted for the azobé (Lophira alata), now in shorter supply. 
In Central Africa, the two pillars of the silvicultural system are the minimum harvesting diameter 
(MHD) and the cutting cycle. Management plans are based on a “management inventory” (sampling 
of 1 - 3 % in general of all species) to be done during the three first years of the concession contract. 
The concessionaire is allowed to cut the annual allowable cut (AAC, expressed in area and volume) 
during the “provisional management convention” of the concession granted for 3 years, during which 
                                                            
21 In many dense forest with closed canopies, inventories show that light-demanding species, although numerous in mature trees 
diameters, are scarce in the smallest diameter classes, announcing a change in the forest composition.  
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time he has to prepare the management plan before being granted with the full convention. Those 
inventories allow for estimating the annual possibility, the geographical sparing of the trees (to 
define the future AACs) and the diametric distribution of the population, needed for assessing the 
dynamics of renewal of the various species and to set the MHDs. 
Management plans are to be prepared by the concessionaire, except in CAR where a public structure 
prepares the plan, which is paid nonetheless by the concessionaire. According to several anecdotal 
feedbacks, the ownership of management plans by the concessionaire in CAR is, therefore, limited 
and questions can be raised about their full implementation. 
In Central Africa, management plans should cover the duration of the cutting cycle. These plans are 
reviewed each 5 or 10 years. In addition, short term management plans are to be prepared for a 5 
years period (also in Liberia).  
• Cutting cycles are of 25 years in Congo and Gabon, 30 years in Cameroon and Liberia, 40 years in 
Ghana. In CAR, the duration is determined by the management plan, between 20 years 
(secondary forests) and 30 years (primary-like forests). In Côte d’Ivoire, the cutting cycle is 
generally of 22 - 25 years.  
• In Central Africa, MHDs are set by the management plan, after examination of the diameter 
structure of the commercial species. The national rule imposes an “administrative MHD” and the  
“management MHDs” cannot be set below the administrative MHD. The management MHD can 
be set up to 120 cm if the species shows a deficit in the small diameters. In general, management 
plans in certified concessions set management MHDs 10 to 30 cm higher than the administrative 
MHDs”22. In Ghana, of all trees in the compartment above the MHD (set by species), only 20% 
will be allocated to the company for logging. 
• The AACs are set in two phases. In Cameroon, Gabon, CAR and Congo, the concession is 
subdivided into 5-years blocs of almost equal volume (based on information of the management 
plan), and then divided into 5 plots of almost the same surface (the AAC). In Ghana, productive 
forest reserves are sub divided into compartments which are the smallest management unit, and 
harvesting is carried out within the confines of these compartments. The compartments in the 
reserves are grouped according to a harvesting schedule. In Ghana, the AAC in natural forests is 
decided on the basis of stock surveys and size limits are prescribed for the various commercial 
species. Only 20% of trees above the diameter limit are to be harvested (around 3 trees per 
hectare), with the rest retained for the next entry in 40 years.  
• In Cameroon, CAR, and Gabon an AAC is open for 3 years (2 years in Congo) and then closed for 
the duration of the cutting cycle. In Ghana, the company is allowed to log the compartments 
within 5 years. The next coupe cannot be entered into before the 5 years has elapsed. In West 
Africa, the rules are quite similar in Liberia (5-years compartment planning, 100% pre-harvest 
inventory of commercial species above MDH) and in Ghana (operators are allowed to log 
compartments grouped in 5-years coupes within 5 years).  
• In CAR, before the opening of an AAC the concessionaires have to perform a 100% pre-harvest 
inventory (all commercial species above 20 cm diameter) which will allow mapping the trees to 
be harvested). In Ghana, it is the Forest Service that surveys the compartment, recording and 
mapping recovery commercial timber trees larger than 50 cm (Asamoah Adam, Pinard and 
Swaine, 2006). From this map the Forest Service calculates the total number of trees the 
company can take using a “yield allocation formula”. 
• In CAR, based on exploitation inventories, the lists of trees and volume to be harvested are 
proposed to the administration, which validates it (or not) and delivers the annual harvesting 
                                                            
22 For more details, see http://www.atibt.org/download/i/mark_dl/u/4012517735/4612072401/Manuel_ATIBT_4e_volet_certification.pdf 
(in French). 
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authorization. In general, concessionaires should not harvest more than what has been agreed 
(with a margin of tolerance in some countries). In some management plans (certified companies), 
there is also a cap set on a voluntary basis for harvesting intensity by surface unit. In the Pokola 
FMU (CIB-Olam, Congo) it is of 2.5 tree/ha and 45 m3/ha based on 25 ha units. In CEB-Precious 
Wood (Gabon), the cap is of 3 trees/ha. In Ghana, Samartex does not harvest more than 2 
trees/ha (larger area unit not specified). 
• Regeneration rates are set by species or group of species. They vary from 50% to 75% of the 
stumpage volume. If the simulations following the management inventory suggest that a 
particular species (or group of species) will not be recovered at the specified rate, the MHD must 
be raised. 
• Post-harvesting silvicultural treatments are not in force in Central Africa. It is generally 
considered that the most important silvicultural actions are associated with the harvest itself, 
with the raising of the MHD when deemed necessary for the reconstitution. Certified concessions 
have also adopted specific voluntary actions, such as the limitation of harvesting to a maximum 
of 3 trees/ha (the case of CEB-Precious Wood in Gabon). Removal of lianas and removal of so-
called secondary species to favour young commercial trees are still controversial and not 
practiced, except in experimental devices. Enrichment plantings in logging gaps are considered 
too expensive to manage over time. In Ghana, once a compartment has been logged, the 
compartment is certified by the Forest Service District Manager, who inspects that 
environmental standards have been adhered to, and that enrichment planting has been done on 
branch roads, skidding trials and on sidings. This ‘concession planting’ is a key part of the 
company’s operations. In Côte d’Ivoire, companies have obligations to replant in proportion to 
their annual harvest (1 ha planted for 250 m3 extracted). Given the difficulty companies face for 
finding perimeters to perform the reforestation, they are allowed to do their plantation in the 
“forêts classées” (where conflicts with settlers often make the sustainability of these plantations 
unlikely). 
Sustainability of harvests without silvicultural operations is, however, questioned in Central Africa. 
Simulations over 2-3 felling cycles suggests that some key commercial species (which are also light-
demanding) will not be recovered, even without considering the initial high volume called “bonus” 
derived from the exploitation in primary-like forests (Karsenty and Gourlet-Fleury, 2006) and their 
volumes will slightly decrease over the felling cycles - without the species being threatened. The 
traditional response would be to raise the MHDs of such species, but it would create important 
financial troubles for the companies. On the other hand, given the extremely selective logging 
practiced in Central Africa, many trees potentially marketable remain untouched and it is likely that 
the market demand for timber will evolve (along with the processing technologies) and domestic 
markets will develop over the time of 2-3 felling cycles (50 - 60 years and more), hence the logging 
characteristics. Therefore, the issue of sustainability of the best current practices remains an open 
question.  
Fauna management 
Management of the fauna is an issue more and more emphasised in the management plans, 
especially for certified concessions. Several studies concluded that fauna (such as elephants) was 
better off in concessions in northern Congo than outside the concessions. Management plans should 
contain provision for the management of the biological diversity, the protection of endangered 
species and ensuring the sustainability of wild meat resources used by local populations as a major 
protein source. 
In certified concessions the management plans contain provisions for a participatory zoning of the 
hunting areas, especially with indigenous people who rely strongly on hunting and are allowed to 
practice their traditional hunting activities except in areas were any hunting is prohibited. Rules are 
established for preventing hunting by outsiders (such as control of log trucks, closing of forest roads 
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not in use, prohibition of road traffic at night, etc.). The plans contain also provisions for monitoring 
of the dynamics population of large mammals and a follow-up of the impact of hunting practiced by 
local populations. 
F. Allocating the concessions 
Many countries announce allocating concessions through an open selection process, and some 
through tendering. In reality, allocation is still very discretionary and only in Cameroon the tendering 
is based on public auctioning which has yielded interesting but controversial results (Box 5).  
Box 5: The experience of Cameroon with an auctioning system for allocating concessions 
Concession allocation through bidding has been encouraged by the World Bank in reform packages, and such a 
procedure is in force in Cameron since 1997.23 The current allocation system is based on an examination of a 
technical offer (with an eliminatory threshold) with a weight of 30% in the final computation, and a proposal 
for setting the per hectare annual area fee, with a weight of 70%. There has been a floor price equivalent to € 
1.5 per hectare since 2000. Normally, bidders commit themselves to pay the area fee they proposed for the 
entire contract duration (15 years, renewable), which made this case almost unique worldwide (contracts are 
generally shorter). In principle, area fees should be updated on a regular basis to reflect domestic inflation, but 
this has not yet been the case. The bidding system has been fought against by prominent operators including 
the best known ones. “Insiders” were very reluctant to give up their long-time established network of 
patronage and face competition. Not surprisingly, “outsiders” have another view. A new generation of 
companies, generally more efficient, have seized this opportunity to enter the Cameroonian forest sector. 
Obviously, once they become insiders, they will be prompt to coalesce with the other players to claim for tax 
cuts. Some important lessons can be drawn from the Cameroonian experience: 
• The area fees proposed by private operators in a market-based environment – USD 4-6 per hectare a year 
on average, and up to USD 13 for “good” forests – are far higher than area fees initially calculated by the 
Government under the administrative system. This result was unexpected for most observers and reveals not 
only the value of Cameroon’s forests on international markets, but also, to some extent, the windfall earnings 
that neighbouring countries were and are still experiencing.  
• One objection to the reform was that, without a comprehensive inventory of the whole forest, 
commercial concession values would remain largely unknown and the auction would be impracticable. In fact, 
though the lack of a comprehensive inventory is a handicap, companies are relatively well informed of the 
composition of the forest auctioned, often previously exploited at low intensity. Nevertheless, the setting of 
the floor price was a tricky matter during the reform process. After being set it at approximately € 2.5 per 
hectare, it has been lowered at approximately USD 1.5 to take into account “the less favoured concessions” 
with lower potential commercial value. 
• In fact, the floor price matters only in few situations, perhaps in less than 10% of the cases. When 
competition is real, the proposed price is significantly above the floor price (from USD 4 to 6, on average, and 
sometimes higher). However, it sometimes happens that there is only one bidder in the allocation process for a 
particular concession and that his bid is only slightly above the floor price. This is often due to the fact that he 
has been informed – against existing regulations – that he is alone in the race. Sometimes, there is no 
proposition at all, which may indicate the floor price is too high.  
• The auction system has been effective in capturing most of the economic forest rent and both 
Government and local council revenues (entitled to 50% of the annual royalty) have increased. The structure of 
forest taxes has changed with most of them concentrated upstream; this is consistent with the decline of 
roundwood exports due to the progressive implementation of a partial log export ban since 1999. 
• A 2006 economic study (Karsenty et al., 2006) found many indications that last allocated concessions 
(particularly in 2005) were marred by new irregularities, as demonstrated by the strong correlation between 
the abnormally low level of financial bids and the many cases where only one bidder was selected at the stage 
                                                            
23 The first round was most disappointing for the World Bank since robust rules were not implemented at this time. New allocation rounds 
resumed in 2000, with better designed allocation rules and the appointment of an Independent Observer. 
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of bid evaluations (all other candidates were eliminated for “insufficient” technical scores). Such a situation 
simply confirms the fact that any mechanism for the award of an economic asset can end up being diverted. 
Another lesson is the fact that the “technical” component of the bidding system gives way to manipulations 
fuelled by corruption, and public opinion (including the civil society and some analysts) is still reluctant to 
accept the idea that the financial offer is the only component that cannot be manipulated. 
• The increase in the costs of access to the forests sparked a range of responses. Some companies 
attempted to enlarge the range of species harvested, provided they could find new markets for them. The most 
efficient wood processors have been able to diversify their finished or half-finished products. Recovery rates 
have globally increased, as several operators have moved toward use and marketing of by-products or new 
products (including moulding, flooring, etc.). Other wood processors have decided to increase the share of out-
sourced raw material, and with the weakness of control by the Forest Service (including widespread 
corruption), contractors are often national entrepreneurs who access the forest through different ways, often 
illegally, and with no forest management activities at all.  
• The traditional contrast between regulation and economic instruments does not make sense here. As we 
pointed out, two types of response exist: one (type 1) is potentially favourable to SFM and is based on forest 
productivity increase (compared to the high-grading initial situation), waste reduction, increase of efficiency in 
wood processing, and attempts at market innovations. The other response (type 2) threatens SFM. It includes 
outsourcing, fiscal evasion and illegal logging. In fact, depending on the pressure they feel from the regulating 
authority, most companies tend to mix “type 1” and “type 2” strategies in varying proportions.24 An 
appropriate policy, backed by a strong political will, has to enforce strict regulations in the field to block the 
“type 2 response”, and apply economic instruments such as a the bidding procedure and an incentive-oriented 
taxation regime. 
Based on the analysis of the Cameroonian experience, one can say that competitive auctions are a 
necessary but not sufficient tool and should not be implemented alone. The competitive auction 
system has some inherent risks, which are exacerbated by the excess of installed capacity and the 
lack of information during the launching phase. The heterogeneity of forests, in terms of occurrence 
and distribution of commercial species, timber quality and proportion of unproductive areas, is not 
always taken into consideration in forest inventories (both reconnaissance and large scale) and an 
information asymmetry is always present in a context of limited public information.  
The companies’ adaptation capacity to diverse characteristics of the resource depends on a number 
of factors, including capital availability, access to markets and the efficiency of the processing 
capacity. These features are not always under the control of firms that often have limited access to 
information, limited capacity of anticipation and can make wrong assessments, all limiting factors 
that can cause risks of overbidding25. Some operators argue that given the fluctuations of the 
international wood market and the unstable institutional and legislative conditions of the country, it 
is impossible for them to correctly reveal their willingness to pay based on expectations on future 
economic rent. Furthermore, having to pay a fixed annual area fee when a large part of the cash flow 
is determined by international volatile prices, exposes the concession-holder to high risks when the 
market is down. Targeted fiscal measures aiming at reducing the risks incurred on versatile 
international markets should be introduced.  
The following set of measures can be considered: 
• Financial means should be given to the Forest Service (or to private firms acting on its behalf) 
to undertake survey inventories aiming at providing accurate public information of the 
commercial potential of the resource to be auctioned. In addition, sufficient time has to be 
given to allow potential bidders to make their own surveys. 
                                                            
24 Even though a handful of companies are clearly committed toward SFM and globally comply with the new regulation system. 
25 Vincent et al. (2003) speak of a “winning curse”. 
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• The area fee should be linked to the international price of tropical woods through the 
creation of a basket of forest products (logs, sawn wood, ply and sliced veneer, plywood) 
from different species on which a wood price index updated yearly would be based.26 
• Export and cutting taxes on secondary species could be significantly reduced in order to 
promote diversification towards these species to counterbalance potential high-grading due 
to higher fixed costs deriving from SFM implementation. And if the forest management plan 
reduces the potential yield (through increase of the minimum exploitability diameter of the 
main species) after the auction (unexpected reduction), a corresponding reduction in the 
area fee can easily be calculated. 
• A reduced area tax could be granted to firms that go beyond legal requirements and get 
independent certification of their forest concession. The Government will have to decide 
what certification system it will endorse and what the duration of the tax rebates for 
certified firms will be. It is clear that this measure would strongly increase certification which 
in turn will result in an acceleration of forest management plan implementation, a pre-
condition for certification. It would return fractions of the captured economic rents to 
operators complying with the law, allowing them to offset the cost of their organizational 
investments and diversify their harvests, in line with management plan prescriptions. To 
convince governments to give up such tangible fiscal revenues, the international community 
could propose to compensate governments for the foregone revenues derived from the 
amount of area certified (for, say, 8-10 years). REDD+ finance could be mobilized for such 
budgetary compensations. This seems a realistic way to take up the idea embodied in the so-
called “performance bond” scheme suggested by several authors (Blakeney 1993, Leruth et 
al., 2001), but whose implementation seems most difficult as long as it does not take into 
account the dynamics of independent certification schemes. 
• Management plans under preparation will define productive and non-productive areas 
within the concession. It would be advisable to have the area fee to be paid only on the 
productive areas once the management plan is ready and approved (it would also provide an 
incentive to achieve readily the forest management plan). This principle has been adopted in 
the DRC. 
• Transferability of concessions (already in force in Cameroon) at auctioned prices should be 
facilitated with minimum interference of the administration. In case of evident overbidding 
(payment default), the operator must return the concession without delay and the possible 
noncompliance with forestry rules must be sanctioned adequately. 
This set of measures can be considered as a useful way of “fine-tuning” the fiscal regulatory 
framework following the consolidation of the competitive allocation process. They are inspired by 
the need for risk reduction, performance recognition (certification), diversification, levelling of the 
playing field conditions and fair treatment of law-abiding operators. If implemented, they would 
reduce fiscal revenue in the short-term. At the same time, they should spur a sounder and more 
vigorous growth of the sector which in turn would benefit the whole economy and counterbalance 
the initial reduction in revenues.  
                                                            
26 Such a mechanism has been mentioned as a possible means of reducing risk associated with the volatility of international timber prices in 
Karsenty (2002), and was also put forward by Vincent et al. (2005). Given that operators might be reluctant to disclose their prices to 
competitors, it is important to work with a price index. This type of information is provided by ITTO twice a month for a dozen of African 
species (logs and sawnwood) could be used as a starting point. 
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G. Taxation regime 
I. An issue less critical in the forest reform agendas 
Taxation regimes evolved over time. After having being historically low and concentrated on log 
exports, taxes have been increased on the concession’s area itself and, in some countries taxes have 
been globally raised as a consequence of the influence of the World Bank on reforms initiated in the 
forestry sector to increase transparency and fiscal receipts – leading to considerable controversies. 
But after the economic crisis of 2008-09, and the decreasing influence of the WB once large debt 
cancellation operations in Central Africa had been completed, tax pressure has been considerably 
lightened, with several bilateral agreements between companies and fiscal administrations.  
For instance, in Gabon, agreements (entailing tax reduction) have been concluded between the 
Ministry of Forestry and many concessionaires for various in-kind services (building and renovation of 
forest’s office, transport of staff, etc.); and other agreements have been gathered by the Presidency 
as incentives for attracting timber processing industries in the Special Economic Zone of Nkok. In the 
DRC, collection of some taxes has been transferred to the provinces, and it has been reported by 
DRC’s officials that bilateral agreements involving in-kind services have led to “demonetization” of 
the taxation (in-kind services against tax cuts). In Cameroon, the area tax has been cut by 50% after 
the 2009 crisis; if this special measure is now over, the recent recovery of the area tax is fuelled by 
new rounds of competitive allocation of “ventes de coupe”, short term permits which unregulated 
exploitation preludes to forest conversion. 
The “super-cycle” of the mineral natural resources started in 2004 (oil) and 2006 (mining products) 
and included also the agricultural products from 2008 on. As many highly forested countries are also 
rich in minerals and oils, they enjoyed since then significant flows of fiscal revenues from these 
activities, and somehow disregarded the modest amounts of receipts the forestry sector usually 
yielded. For instance, in Congo-Brazzaville, forest taxes compare to potential oil revenues in a 
proportion of 1 to 80 - 100.  
Conjugated with the debt reduction negotiated around the same period – and the subsequent 
decline of influence of international organizations such as the IMF and the WB that insisted on fiscal 
efforts to make country debts sustainable repayment –, forest taxation is no more a major issue in 
the forested countries. Whether the apparent end of the “supercycle” and the decline of oil and 
mineral prices (and even agricultural product prices, such as oil palm) might reverse this trend is an 
open issue. With the end of the exploitation cycle in primary forests and growing human population, 
policy priority assigned to the forest sector is employment. The timber industry can, therefore, refuse 
high taxation in the name of employment and, so far, this has been an effective strategy since 
processed products are much less taxed than logs (whose exports are restricted if not banned). 
In some countries, such as the DRC, Cameroon or CAR, the “parafiscalité” (taxes or “contributions” 
not planned in the Finance Law but created at administrative level) have considerably increased and 
somehow replaced the formal taxation regime, with a blurred boundary with corruption and racket 
(Cerutti and Tacconi, 2006). Since ministries face difficulties to get their budgetary allocation for 
investment and functioning, many administrations (especially those who can potentially hamper the 
business) use, and often abuse, of their prerogatives to levy specific monetary contributions. As a 
result, companies often pay a lot of “contributions” to various public administrations, with only little 
sums entering the Public Treasury. 
II. Transparency and Independent Observer 
Transparency has increased but public information is still difficult to access and governments are 
reluctant to provide on-line updated information on concession holders. Fiscal information is still a 
very sensitive matter, and transparency is extremely limited, in spite of the EITI (Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative) and other measures such as the Economic Government Matrix conducted 
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between WB and the DRC Government27. The EITI encompasses the timber sector alongside the 
mining and oil/gas industries, but a country can decide to expand the EITI requirements to forestry. 
This decision has been taken in Liberia, the only one in the selected countries. In 2013, the EU 
adopted a new “Accounting and Transparency Directives” introducing a new obligation for large 
logging companies (concession-based logging of natural and semi-natural forests) listed in the EU to 
report the payments they make to governments. Large European concessionaires resist this 
obligation and complain that their Asian competitors are not subject to the same obligation. Seven 
EU members have started translating the directive into their national legislations.  
A first experience of Independent Observer (IO) has been experienced in Cameroon after long and 
difficult discussions between the WB and the Government (Topa et al., 2009). This Independent 
Observer of the concession allocation process participates into the commission that decides to whom 
the permits will be attributed, following a strict procedure of ranking involving a financial bid. This 
innovation produced interesting results in terms of governance and transparency at the end of the 
1990’s and the beginning of the 2000’s, when a major re-allocation of concessions took place. But, to 
be a driver of change the information has to be used by the authorities. In Cameroon, the report of 
the IO of permits allocation was mattering in the first years, but it gradually ceased to be used in the 
dialogue with donors. It is also true that most concessions were attributed in the mid-2000, making 
the role of this Observer less critical than it was some years before. 
The introduction of IOs has improved the situation regarding the level of law enforcement in the 
field. However, the public information available rarely translated into sanctions or reform of the 
monitoring system of the administration (see Box 6). On one hand, the governments formally agree 
with such institutional innovation as testimonies of their goodwill to enforce forest laws, but on the 
other hand the vested interests inside the Forest Services are reluctant to sincerely support such 
processes. Big international environmental NGOs, which are keen at pinning to their list Western 
companies sensitive to the public opinion, have not used extensively the published results of these 
IOs when the companies called into question were not those usually targeted by these NGOs. With 
the FLEGT process, the role of IOs should become critical, but it seems that governments are not 
willing to use the information revealed and to follow the practical recommendations made by the 
teams. 
                                                            
27 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a voluntary initiative with the objective of improving transparency and 
accountability in countries rich in oil, gas, and mineral resources. Once a host country endorses the initiative, the EITI process is mandatory 
for all extractive industry operators (including those that are state-owned) operating within that country. 
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Box 6: Independent observation in support of forest law enforcement 
In Cameroon, Global Witness was appointed as the first Independent Observer (IO) of the forest sector in May 
2001 for a transitional period. In May 2002, the appointment was extended until another Independent 
Observer (Resources Extraction Monitoring, REM) was recruited through an international tender. The project 
“Independent Observation in Support of Forest Law Enforcement in Cameroon” can be summarized as 
following:  
- ensuring the objectivity and transparency of control operations conducted by the Ministry in charge of 
Forestry by including an IO with international credibility, monitoring how law enforcement filed missions are 
carried out and whose reports will be published; 
- monitoring and observing all phases of forest law enforcement in Cameroon, from field investigations 
to payment of penalties, taxes and compensations and/or the final judicial verdict through the Issuing of 
Statements of Offence (Procès-verbaux) by a control unit; 
- facilitating clarification on the means of control, through a description of roles of those involved in 
forestry control; 
- assisting the Ministry to develop and put in place systems for monitoring control missions and 
litigation and case tracking, based on the legal and regulatory framework in force. 
The IO does not have a function or power of “control” or law enforcement, but that of independent 
observation and support for the implementation of an effective control system. Issuing of Statements of 
Offence and sanctions remains a function of the Government. The IO is recognized by the Government in an 
official capacity and works in close cooperation with all relevant departments, albeit independently. This 
position facilitates access to official information related to forest control available, such as maps of valid 
logging titles, statistics, tax collection documents… Since 2011, the role of the IO has been taken over by 
AGRECO, with the support of the NGO Cameroon Forest Watch (http://www.oicameroun.org/).  
In Congo, the Government asked REM in 2007 to implement Independent Observation. REM and the Congo 
NGO CAGDF led the process until June 2013, with EU and UK funding. CAGDF, then, took over. Contrary to 
Cameroon, the missions of the IO were not operated jointly with the Forest Service. The IO had the obligation 
to inform the administration of the location of the mission and the companies to be visited. Mission reports of 
the Independent monitor must be adopted by a Reading Committee (Comité de Lecture) before being 
published. The Committee is presided over by the Forest Director and includes representatives from the three 
independent monitors, as well as a representative from civil society; donors can also be invited as observers, 
and EU representatives have regularly participated. The Government cannot block the adoption of the report, 
though any objections they may have can be noted in it. Reports are accessible on the Internet: 
http://www.observation-congo.info/Rapports.html  
In the DRC, REM carried out the IO role from 2010 to April 2013, with funding from the EU. The project ended 
in December 2013 and reports are accessible at http://www.observation-rdc.info/. An NGO called OGF 
(Observatoire de la Gouvernance Forestière) has taken over since then (http://www.ogfrdc.cd/).  
All these initiatives have yielded interesting results in terms of knowledge of the violations, their various nature 
and realistic assessments of the magnitude of illegal logging. But the process was not really supported by the 
governments. Reports pointing out the infractions with the name of the involved societies are published on the 
Internet. The review committee did not object reports presented by the IO pointing out serious administrative 
dysfunctions. But no further action is taken by the administration (suspension of contracts, etc.), revealing the 
lack of ownership of the process by national authorities although the IO is put forward by governments in 
international forums to affirm “good governance” in the forest sector. 
H. Experiences with Log Export Bans 
Partial or total log export bans (LEB) have been introduced in several countries, but are only strongly 
implemented in a couple of countries, such as Gabon, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Cameroon and Congo 
use quotas allocated to companies but these are not strictly enforced (e.g. in Congo).  
• In Cameroon, the “traditional species” (generally redwood) must be transformed in the 
country but the main species harvested, ayous (Triplochiton scleroxylon), can be exported as 
logs against the payment of an extra tax. In 2009-2010, the Cameroonian Government 
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allowed temporarily the log exports of traditional species, which boosted the exports. Today, 
this authorization is closed and around 1/3 of the industrial log production is exported as 
logs. Quotas of log exports rights for ayous and azobé (Lophira alata) have been introduced, 
but allocation of these quotas is discretionary and entails governance issues.  
• In Congo, concessionaires are requested to transform at least 85% of their log production. 
This obligation is fulfilled by the certified companies, but most companies do not comply 
with this obligation. In 2010, the Government allowed for transferability of the implicit 15% 
quota of authorized log exports. But public authorities experience difficulties at managing 
this system since the exchange of information between the various services of the ministry in 
charge of forests and custom services is dysfunctional. In the last years, around 1/3 of the log 
production has been exported as logs (more than double the 15% quota). 
• In Equatorial Guinea, a presidential decree has been issued in 2007 prohibiting log exports.  
After the issuance of the decree, all concessions were cancelled and only short term permits 
were delivered, leading to a collapse of the production from more than 500,000 m3 in 2007 
to 13,700 m3 in 2009 (Figure 22). By the end of 2008, the presidential decree was de facto 
abrogated and log exports resumed. Shimmer International, a subsidiary of the large 
Malaysian company Rimbunan Hijau, came back into the forest sector. Certified companies 
(legality) are allowed to export up to 50% of their production. The others have to pay 5000 
FCFA (USD 0.85) for m3 exported as logs. In 2013, 11 companies shared 740.122 ha, 
representing 48 concessions (which are very small areas). 
Figure 22: Evolution of the timber production in Equatorial Guinea (thousands of cubic meters) 
 
Source: WRI - Atlas forestal interactivo de la República de Guinea Ecuatorial 
 
• The 1997 Forest Law caps the production at 450,000 m3 annually, but it is obvious that this 
was not respected up to 2008. In the meantime, areas devoted to production forests 
(Bosques Nacionales) diminished dramatically: the Government reduced them significantly 
from 1,67 million in 1997 to 740,000 ha in 2013 as the oil production was increasing. 
• In CAR, the forest code requires concessionaires installed for more than 3 years to process 
60% of their production. A subsequent Finance Law raises this threshold to 77%, but the law 
is barely enforced.  
• In the DRC, only the holders of mills can export logs for a maximum of 30% of their 
production. Here too, the law is poorly enforced. 
 
Log export bans for the most valuable species have an economic cost, as specific qualities of logs – 
most often the highest quality, but also low-grade timber in demand as logs on Asian markets – are 
processed rather than exported. The economic cost is generated by low processing efficiency which 
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causes a given log to lose economic value in the processing compared to selling it as logs on the 
international market (to be processed abroad in more efficient sawmills struggling to buy logs). Not 
all timber processing entails a loss of added value, as there are efficient plants with good wood 
processing rates able to fetch high prices for their products. LEBs create also perverse incentives as 
they encourage companies to acquire poor processing equipment simply to comply with the law. And 
the eviction of the foreign demand (the most remunerative) for logs tend to decrease log prices on 
the domestic market, allowing inefficient sawmills to remain competitive thanks to the low price of 
the raw material (as long as the timber resource is balanced with industrial capacities installed).  
 
The same phenomenon has been observed in Ghana with low domestic prices of logs compared to 
the FOB prices of the same species exported in Central Africa. In 1995, M. Richards analysing the log 
export ban in force in Ghana stated that “log export bans have caused severe distortions on the 
domestic market encouraging consumption of endangered species and negating the environmental 
objectives of the bans. Both the low royalties and log export ban have encouraged over-capacity and 
inefficiency in processing, to add to already high wastage levels in the forest”. Hansen and Lund 
(2011) consider that “inefficiencies result in a loss of raw wood in the order of 1.1 million m3 annually 
in Ghana”.  See also Box 7. 
 
Box 7: The opportunity cost of the log export ban  
The average declared FOB price of sapelli sawnwood exported from Cameroon is listed at € 605 per m3 by ITTO-
Market News Service (MNS) in July 2015. The FOB price for Congo Basin sapelli logs was listed as € 320 per m3 
for “B” quality by ITTO-MNS at the same time (sapelli cannot be exported as logs from Cameroon). The 
recovery rate in simple sawmills (i.e. without drying facilities or industrial carpentry for by-products re-
utilization) is 36% on average. This means that the log equivalent value of exported sawnwood is € 218, to 
compare with the actual FOB price of € 320 for logs exported from, say, Congo. Even though the log sawn was 
of the lowest merchantable quality (BC/C, listed at € 240 exported as logs by ITTO), there would be an 
opportunity cost of € 22, without accounting for the energy needed to run the sawmill.28  
In other words, sapelli logs processed in these mills could have been exported for a minimum of € 664 and up 
to € 886 (B grade), instead of the € 600-610 value yielded by the export on 1 m3 of sapelli. A recovery rate of 
52% would be needed to formally nullifying the opportunity cost of exporting sawnwood rather than logs, 
without accounting for the energy and the depreciation of machines used. By doing by-products, wood 
processors can increase the overall recovery rate (even though the value of by-products does not equate the 
one of the main product) and be better-off transforming rather than importing logs. Obviously, the reasoning is 
even more relevant for those wood processors doing specific products of high value. In any case, one can guess 
that, given the heterogeneity of timber industries, a total log export ban generates opportunity costs for many 
players. 
What varies also is the income distribution. With a higher volume of exported logs, a greater part of 
the forest rent goes to the Public Treasury, as taxation is heavier on logs as compared to processed 
products. Under a LEB the fiscal receipts drop (see Gabon’s case) but governments hope that there 
will be more employment, which is not systematically happening (see again the case of Gabon). The 
share of the economic rent going to the industry could probably be greater as compared to a free 
trade situation, given that domestic prices of logs tend to decrease (elimination of the foreign 
demand for logs). A more comprehensive analysis on added-value generated by the processing 
industry would need to be carried out in each case in order to make reliable assessments. This 
analysis should assess the positive impacts on added value of establishing a log export ban which 
includes wage distribution and industrial capital remuneration against a reduction in transportation 
activity due to lower volumes (this reduction in transportation may also yield important 
environmental benefits, especially when transportation is essentially made by trucks). 
                                                            
28 Some companies obtain high recovery rates on the main products by selecting only the highest quality logs for processing. In this case, 
processing efficiency would be higher, but so would be the opportunity cost associated with logs which are not exported 
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Figure 23: Log exported by several Central Africa’s countries and Liberia 
 
displays the evolution of log exports in countries where this is still allowed and shows a certain 
resilience of this trade activity.  
Figure 23: Log exported by several Central Africa’s countries and Liberia 
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The more recent LEB case of Gabon is described in (Box 8).and some data illustrating the result can 
be seen in Figure 24.  
 
Box 8: Gabon’s experience with the log export ban (LEB): facing a logjam 
In 2010, the Government of Gabon decided to ban log exports, a measure entering in force in 2011. This was 
quite surprising, inasmuch as Gabon was the largest log exporter of Africa, and was not well-known for its 
industrial traditions. The impact has been significant for the forest sector. The timber production dropped 
brutally and dramatically. Although the usual figures of production for Gabon (source: ITTO) were around 3.2 to 
3.5 million m3 (with a peak at 3.94 million m3 in 2009, just before the LEB), the 2012 production was just 1.7 
million m3 and the 2014 figure is likely to be between 1.8 and 1.9 million m3. The profitability of the timber 
activity became, overall, negative, since the financial margins were linked essentially to the export of logs. 
Therefore, the perimeter of profitability of logging shrunk and several concessions stopped or reduced their 
activities, especially when they did not have enough processing capacities.  
As all companies suffered financial losses up to 2013, thanks to restructuring, high international log prices for 
the African timber and an active domestic market for high-quality logs (for peeling), a handful of companies 
resumed profits in 2013-2104, but have to bear the losses of the previous years (debts) damaging their 
investment capacity. New sawmills (and some peeling units) have been built, raising the installed processing 
capacity (input) of transformation to 2.6 million m3, resulting in a situation of overcapacity as long as the 
production does not reach its previous levels. Employment, according to figures from the Ministry of Forest 
Economy, is slightly below the pre-LEB situation: 8,200 employees in 2014 against 8,900 in 2009. But this 
accounts only for direct employment, not for the indirect employment (log transport, port facilities…) that has 
been lost in the meantime (probably several thousands, but there is no figure available). Fiscal receipts, 
essentially based on taxation of log exported, dropped dramatically: although forest taxes (area, felling and 
export taxes) yielded in the past around 30 to 40 billion FCFA in average (USD 50 to 65 million, and even 75 
million in 2009), in 2014 the “Direction Générale des Impôts” suggests these are 6 billion FCFA (USD 10 million) 
only.  
The Government was expecting that logs that could no longer be exported would be transformed in plywood, 
veneers and sawn wood – and also in furniture. But the international competitiveness of those Gabonese 
processed products is limited, as the country has relatively high production costs (wages, port handling…). In 
addition, given the narrowness of the domestic market, the opportunity for producing and commercializing by-
products is also limited, and wood recovery rates cannot take-off. In addition, the Government pledged in 2010 
a 40 billion FCFA (USD 65 million) for a fund intended to support the investment in processing, which has not 
been created yet.  
For the concessions themselves, significant changes have taken place in ownership. Many mid-size players 
whose activities were based on log exports gave up their activity or had no choice but to supply large wood 
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processing units at lower prices. Some Asian newcomers took over existing companies or decided to invest in 
processing facilities in the newly created Special Economic Zone (free of tax) of Nkok29. On the other hand, the 
Olam company, which is associated with the Government for running the Special Economic Zone devoted 
initially to timber, decided to retire from forest activities and sold its business to a (new coming) Chinese 
company.  
Figure 24: In Gabon, the log export ban entailed a sharp drop of the production and overcapacities for wood 
processing (data: ITTO Annual Statistics On-Line) 
 
 
Employment opportunities generated  
Overall, concessions provide direct employment for around 135,000 workers in the selected 
countries of West (Liberia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire) and Central Africa (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, DRC, 
CAR and Equatorial Guinea). The informal sector is likely to provide much more jobs in populated 
countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Ghana, and Cameroon, according to estimates (more than 
100,000 jobs in Cameroon, up to 15,000 permanent jobs in DRC and probably much more if one 
takes into account also the non-permanent jobs). One specificity of jobs provided by the timber 
sector is that they are among the rare jobs available in remote and economically marginalized areas 
(the forest zones), and which target non skilled people. It is estimated that one permanent job in 
Central Africa sustains the livelihood of 10-12 relatives. Table 2 gives the best estimates one can 
propose to compare direct industrial employment and jobs provided by the artisanal sector. 
 
                                                            
29 Fiscal privileges include a 10-year exemption from corporate tax and another five years at a 10% tax rate. There is no customs duty for 25 
years for imported materials and the export of manufactured goods. The companies are exempt from VAT for 25 years and will receive a 
50% discount on their electricity costs. The benefits also include free transfer of funds and flexible employment regulations for foreign 
workers. 
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Table 2: Estimates of production and employment provided by the artisanal/informal sector (Sources: 
documents by Lescuyer and Cerutti, 2006 and 2013, completed by various other sources) 
  Cameroon DRC Congo CAR Gabon Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Ghana Liberia 
Annual domestic 
consumption 
from informal 
chainsaw milling 
(sawnwood) (m3) 
662 000 1 024 000 100 000 34 000 50 000 Between 
1.5 and 3 
million 
497 000 140 000 
Estimated 
informal 
sawnwood 
exported (m3) 
53 000 112 000 - 5 000 - ? 260 000 ? 
Total (m3) 715 000 1 126 000 100 000 39 000 50 000  757 000 140 000 
Roundwood 
equivalent (m3) 
2 359 500 3 715 800 330 000 128 700 165 000 - 2 498 100 462 000 
Employment 
artisanal sector 
45 000 25 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 ? 86 000 5 300 
Employment 
industrial sector 
11 500 6 000 7 500 4 000 8 200 10 000 37 000 5000-6000 
I. The impact of forest certification 
Certification of “good management” 30 has been a game-changer in Central Africa, for the six 
companies who get such scheme for their concessions (Decolvenaere decided to abandon the FSC in 
2015). All are EU-domiciled companies holding large concessions with markets oriented towards the 
Western world. Certification pushes companies to legal auto-regulation, since a negative audit would 
mean jeopardizing their market shares in some EU markets. No new concession has been certified for 
a couple of years now, questioning about the potential of certification for expanding beyond the so-
called “early-movers”. Even more concerning, one of the two certified concessionaires in Congo is 
looking actively for a buyer of its concession.  
All certified companies have not reached the same level of achievements. Some of them have 
reached an impressive level with respect to social criteria, rights recognition and benefits sharing 
with local communities. “Success stories” in Gabon and Congo are often exposed, but such 
achievements are fragile as the cost of reaching them is often questioned by the shareholders of the 
related international groups. 
Investment in certification means significant costs, not every time compensated by the price 
premium (which sometimes does not exist). Legality certification (OLB, VLC, FSC-CW…) that has 
multiplied since the entry in force of the EUTR, somehow compete with “good management” 
certification and competition is likely to increase when FLEGT licenses will be available in the future. 
Internal discussions within the FSC tend to crystallize on the Congo Basin, with pressures to 
strengthen the requirements for the industrial concessions, especially with the issue of the “Intact 
Forest Landscapes” (IFL, see Box 9), which could force some FSC-certified concessionaires having IFL 
in their concessions to abandon the FSC and to seek an alternative with the PEFC/PAFC currently 
                                                            
30 FSC is the only scheme certifying good stewardship of forest so far in Central Africa. There are other schemes (PEFC/PAFC) but with no 
client until now. 
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pushed by stakeholders. A map crossing concessions and IFL has been produced for Central Africa by 
FRM Ingénierie, showing the magnitude of the issue (Figure 25).  
Figure 25: Map of the Intact Forest Landscapes and their impact on the concessions
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Box 9: The issue of Intact Forest Landscapes 
The definition of IFLs can be found at http://www.intactforests.org : “an unbroken expanse of natural 
ecosystems within the zone of current forest extent, showing no signs of significant human activity and large 
enough that all native biodiversity, including viable populations of wide-ranging species, could be maintained. 
Although all IFL are within the forest zone, some may contain extensive naturally tree-less areas, including 
grasslands, wetlands, lakes, alpine areas, and ice. This definition builds on the definition of Frontier Forest that 
was developed by WRI (Bryant et al., 1997).”  
Greenpeace emphasizes this notion and triggered discussion within the FSC. In a document called “Tropical 
Forest Fragmentation - Implications for Ecosystem Function” (Ellis-Cockcroft and Cotter, 2014), the authors 
write: Although our understanding of tropical forest ecosystem function remains incomplete, there is 
undoubtedly a strong argument for the need to preserve large areas (500 km2+) of intact forest(…). This is 
especially true given that it is unknown whether the transition between the ecosystem function and ecosystem 
services of primary forest and that of secondary forest is linear … Furthermore, fragmented forest, particularly 
in light of retrogressive succession, is unlikely to support key functional groups involved in the maintenance of 
ecosystem stability, such as large frugivores and apex 
predators….While it has been demonstrated that some aspects of 
ecosystem function can be maintained in moderately disturbed 
forests(…), the evidence presented here strongly caution against any 
encroachment into intact forests.  
The sketch at the side, excerpted from the Greenpeace report, gives an 
idea of what an IFL is. 
During the 2014 FSC General Assembly, Greenpeace Int. passed a 
motion with 9 principles aiming at protecting the IFLs and calling FSC 
national working group “to develop, modify, or strengthen (according 
to standards revision processes) indicators within National Standards 
and CB standards that aim to protect the vast majorities of IFLs”, failing which “If by the end of 2016 a relevant 
standard has not been implemented, a default indicator will apply that mandates the full protection of a core 
area of each IFL within the management unit. For this purpose, the core area of the IFL will be defined as an 
area of forest comprising at least 80% of the intact forest landscape falling within the FMU”.  
For instance, the #4 principle states “Within IFL cores ensure that Certificate Holders implement protection 
measures (for example, set-asides, legal protected areas, conservation reserves, deferrals, community reserves, 
indigenous protected areas etc.) ensuring management for intactness, in areas within their control”.  
Concessionaires believe that this will practically prevent exploitation under FSC certification in many 
forests in Congo, Cameroon and Gabon. In Congo, 42% of the IFLs are included into the concessions; 
it is 54% in Cameroon, 63% in Gabon and even 74% in CAR. Consequently, some of them consider 
abandoning the FSC and looking for a PEFC alternative (through the PAFC, a scheme initiated in the 
beginning of the 2000’s but without clients, that was taken over some years ago by the PEFC). But 
the potential disaffiliation of several large companies with the FSC might have a significant impact for 
their exports in Europe and North America, since opponents to industrial concessions will certainly 
claim the PEFC/PAFC certificate does not provide the same environmental guarantees as they do not 
consider the IFLs. 
J. New interests for forestland and new challenges for the 
concession regime 
The markets for African timbers have profoundly changed during the last 15 years. China, and 
increasingly other emerging Asian markets are replacing the traditional western outlet, and 
especially the EU market. As a consequence, Asian interests are gradually taking over European ones, 
and most of the area and industrial production are now taken by Asian companies (see Table 3 for an 
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illustration). Since the profitability of the activity is low (when complying with the regulations in 
force), many European companies have sold their activities to Asian companies who, on the one 
hand, are sometimes less concerned about some regulations and, on the other hand, have more 
effective trading networks (buyers advancing up to one third of the cost of operations for their 
contract). This is also why forest management certification does not expand further so far, even 
though some newcomers in Gabon (such as the Chinese KHLL who has taken over Olam-Bois 
concessions in Gabon) claim that they are interested in certification. Given that Asian companies 
often re-export semi-finished products made with African timbers to Europe or the USA, these 
companies are considering at least legality certification to facilitate re-export.  
Table 3: Most significant changes in ownership from European to Asian companies 
Country Name of the company Successive owners Current owner 
Congo Compagnie Industrielle des Bois 
(CIB) 
Initially French, then German, 
then Danish, then Asian  
Olam (Singapore, with 
majority Indian shareholders) 
Congo 
Cameroon 
Compagnie Equatorienne des 
Bois (CEB) 
(In Gabon CEB has been taken 
over by Precious Wood – 
Switzerland) 
French, then Chinese VicWood (HK) 
Gabon Société des Bois de Lastourville 
(SBL) 
French, then Chinese (2014) Sun Company  
 
Gabon Leroy-Gabon, POGAB French, then Portuguese, then 
Chinese, then… 
Legal conflict between the 
former Chinese owner and 
Ghassan Bitar (Lebanese) 
who bought Plyrosol, the 
factory in France  
Congo SOCOBOIS German, then Chinese Asia-Congo Industries 
Since 3-4 years, there is almost no more “primary” or “primary-like” productive forest to be exploited 
within the “perimeter of profitability” (depending mainly on transport infrastructures) of the 
forestland in Central Africa. All forests are “secondarized” to a more or less extent, meaning the 
“primary forest rent” has been largely dissipated by the first felling cycle. As a consequence, profits 
are less than they have been in the past and the industry has started to restructure to adapt to the 
new availability of commercial species.  
Unlike what happened in Southeast Asia, where, thanks to the relative homogeneity of stands rich in 
dipterocarp forests, commercial species were grouped under well-known names (e.g. meranti) 
leading to intense harvests, in Central African logged forests there are many species left that are 
potentially marketable. Important investments in processing and marketing will be required to re-
create opportunities for a new economic rent, but the “insiders” (current concessionaires) are not 
wealthy enough to make this investment and there is a big question mark on the potential 
“outsiders” that could invest in Africa’s forest sector. 
Forest concessions and the timber sector in general have received a lower policy priority in the last 5-
10 years in the region, in spite of REDD+ (or due to the lower expectations vis-à-vis this scheme). In 
West and Central Africa, economic growth is associated largely with the extractive industries, and to 
a lesser extent to the large-scale expansion of perennial crops such as palm oil trees, rubber wood 
and cocoa. Mining permits (exploration and exploitation) have a legal (and political) priority over 
forest concessions. Many concessions are overlapped by mining permits, causing difficulties to follow 
management plans and, in some cases, abandonment of the certification (e.g. Decolvenaere in 
Cameroon). Governments are also aggressively promoting agribusiness, often at the expense of the 
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concessions – as in Cameroon, where the Government balks at signing the gazetting acts for 
incorporating the concession in the Permanent Forest Estate.  
One part of the concession forest sector in Africa is more and more “externally driven” in terms of 
ecological and social norms, because of the concern of Western consumers and public opinion about 
the fate of tropical forests, connected to global climate change issues. This creates incentives to raise 
the environmental standards of the global forest industry, and favours large scale concessions that 
can cope with the stringent requirements embodied in legal certification and log tracking, sustainable 
forest management certification, social care for local populations, and significant fiscal contribution. 
This has the effect of squeezing out small-scale operators, who often resort to becoming, or 
remaining “informal” to avoid overregulation and associated corruption. In countries where the 
potential for domestic markets is low, producers face strong competition from other countries, 
corporations and business models. Concentration and restructuration (of the export-oriented) on the 
one hand, and fragmentation (of the domestic-oriented) on the other, seem to be the current trend 
in the logging industry of the Congo Basin. 
REDD+ will probably not directly benefit forest concessions, despite the “Sustainable Management of 
Forest” eligibility activity associated with the “+” of REDD+. An increase of the minimum diameter of 
felling, and, to a lesser extent, an extension of the cutting cycle can increase carbon stocks but the 
opportunity costs will be significant for companies. Given the current difficulties with the carbon 
markets and the low prices of carbon credits, perspectives are limited. It is also unlikely that the so-
called “voluntary market” could be an outlet for the carbon credits that would be possibly emitted by 
concessionaires through “REDD+ projects”, given the mixed perception of the industrial logging (and 
constant NGOs’ campaigns against this activity). In addition, the issue of non-permanence is a serious 
one given the frequent changes in ownership of the concessions – and also the risk of conversion.  
Moreover, the second “D” of REDD+ (avoided degradation) will more likely pave the way toward 
“conservation concessions” that could be remunerated rather than for “improved logging 
concessions”, as though selective logging is not deforestation it could be considered as causing 
degradation (even though potentially reversible). Thus, turning logging concessions into conservation 
concessions could be eligible as “avoided degradation” activities (Box 10). 
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Box 10: Conservation concessions in Central Africa 
A couple of conservation concessions have been established in Central Africa, especially in the DRC which have 
incorporated the concept in the 2002 Forest Code. A pilot project funded by the Congo Basin Forest 
Partnership proposes to create a 485,000 ha of Conservation Concessions in the Equateur Province of DRC by 
converting a former (cancelled) timber concession to conservation. The project has been initiated by 
Conservation International. Its principle is to pay the government the annual area fee and to manage the 
concession as a protected area. Communities participate in conservation management in return for local 
development investments such as constructing schools and bridges, as well as training and materials to raise 
agricultural productivity.  
Another conservation concession initiative is associated with the Maï Ndombe REDD+ project. The area was a 
former logging concession on the shores of Lac Maï Ndombe that was cancelled in 2007. A Canadian company 
(Ecosystem Restoration Associates (ERA) Carbon Offsets Ltd.) with a local DRC partner spent 3 years to acquire 
the concession. It includes different measures for the conservation and sustainable use of 299,645 hectares of 
rainforest and aims to improve the living conditions of the indigenous and local communities living in the 
project area, comprising 26 villages and around 50.000 inhabitants. In December 2012, the project was 
validated to both, the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance 
(CCBA). Standards and carbon credits were sold in January 2013 on the voluntary carbon market. The project is 
now run by Wildlife Works Carbon (WWC) which took over ERA interests in the Maï Ndombe joint venture. 
After the initial selling of 2013, the project has faced difficulties to find new buyers and many certified VCU 
(Verified Certification Units, carbon credits validated by the VCS) could not be sold. In 2014, the project decided 
even not to certify its “credits” given the gloomy commercial perspectives.  
A conservation concession is to be included into a wider area that constitutes the future “jurisdictional Maï 
Ndombe REDD+ project” supported by the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank (FCPF) and the 
Forest Investment Program (WB and AfDB), covering 12.3 million ha, including 9.8 million ha of forests. 
Articulation between the conservation concession project and the wider jurisdictional project is challenging, 
given the different parameters adopted for calculating the baseline scenario of deforestation and carbon stocks 
measurements. 
In Cameroon, conservationists, led by Conservation International and relayed eventually by WWC, contemplate 
since 2001 the possibility to create a conservation concession on the 9 FMUs of primary forests in the region of 
Ngoyla Mintom. Those FMUs, once earmarked for logging in the zoning plan of Cameroon have been kept 
unallocated by the Government who was waiting for financial offers from conservationists (The Economist, Feb 
14th, 2008). Finally, in 2012 the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife decided to launch a public tendering open to 
both loggers and conservationists for the 9 FMUs. Almost all the FMUs were allocated to loggers (except a 
“biology offset” area won by a mining company), but after reactions of donors the Government modified his 
decision and decided in August 2012 to allocate only half of the FMUs to loggers and maintain for the time 
being the statu quo on the second half. 
Conservation concessions in Central Africa are quite different from the initial conception advocated by 
Conservation International in the beginning of the 2000’s, where the idea was to buy back the logging rights to 
the forest concessionaires, possibly after the first felling cycle reduce the financial compensation for loggers 
(Rice et al., 2001). Only the Government is remunerated, based on the fixed-area tax applicable to logging 
concessions. With REDD+ and the perspective brought by the carbon market, the conservation concession idea 
has been subsumed into the concept of “REDD+ projects”. But with the difficulties faced by this market and the 
concentration of donors on jurisdictional projects on a much larger scale, the short-term potential for 
expansion of conservation concessions has been reduced. 
The FLEGT program and the VPAs proposed by the EU are facing considerable difficulties in West and 
Central Africa. The difficulty of ensuring and verifying all the timber production at national level has 
been overestimated both by the EU and by the African governments who have, in some countries like 
Cameroon and Congo, pushed for including also the domestic market in the scope of the VPA 
agreements. Companies exporting to Western markets sought for legality certification proposed by 
private bodies and want them be recognized as “proof of legality” by the African national authorities 
and “negligible risk” by the EU national authorities for the exported timber. The FLEGT program 
failed to reduce the level of illegal timber at country level and the unfair competition between 
players so far. 
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Box 11: Waiting for FLEGT licenses 
Along with deforestation, the legality of timber entering the world market has been the topic at the top of the 
tropical forestry agenda for some years. The EU has taken the initiative in proposing Voluntary Partnership 
Agreements (VPA), to help producer countries bring their legality systems into line, to reinforce their 
monitoring capacities and, the decisive step, to ensure independent certification of national systems of 
verification of legality, so that timber exported to the EE benefits from Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade, or FLEGT, certifications, thus enabling European importers to feel assured that that they are putting 
legally harvested timber onto the market. Since March 2013, the Timber Regulation of the European Union 
(EUTR) requires importers to exercise due diligence to ensure that the timber they want to import presents no 
significant risk of illegal production. This has led to a growth in constraints on the players in the supply chain, to 
be overcome by buying tropical timber with FLEGT certifications -- when they are available.  
Although six countries (including five African nations) implement VPAs, none has yet proved able to perfect a 
national system of verification and traceability that is deemed to be sufficiently watertight. The surely excessive 
ambitious aim to ensure that these legality assurance systems cover all national production, and not just 
exports to the EU, makes it difficult to take the final step, given the lack of control of the artisanal production, 
which is mainly responsible for supplying these countries’ domestic markets. 
For their part, firms for which Europe is still a major market, have adopted private systems. These are systems 
of traceability and verification of legality, or good forestry management certification systems that include 
verification of legality. Professional associations ask for national authorities in charge of applying the EUTR in 
different EU countries to consider there are negligible risks of illegality when importers put timber onto the 
market with such private certifications. But the European authorities baulk at adopting a solution of this kind, 
which would weaken the efforts within the VPA framework to reinforce national institutions and improve 
governance. In particular, this would acknowledge the fact that private certification systems, paid for by the 
companies themselves, could perform as well as the ambitious – and very expensive – FLEGT programme that 
has become the much-trumpeted cause of the Commission for Tropical Forests. 
With the increasing demographic density in many parts of West and increasingly Central Africa, the 
room for large-scale concessions is shrinking (exceptions being essentially Gabon and the Republic of 
Congo as well as parts of DRC). Competition by other land-uses and other tenure systems (small-scale 
enterprises, private or community-based) is more acute. Two big scenarios can be foreseen for the 
next 15-20 years: 
• A progressive fragmentation of most of the concessions (except in some remote parts of a 
handful of countries), with massive land conversion to agribusiness or small-scale agriculture. 
This tendency will be associated with a growing informalisation of the timber activity 
(including community forestry, which will remain largely unregulated) and a declining export 
sector. In parallel, a development of intensive plantations to substitute the shrinking natural 
forest production can be expected, providing a couple of land tenure issues are tackled in the 
next future. 
• An evolution of the concession system, from a mono-exploitation (timber) to a broader 
spectrum of activities, mixing SFM and valorisation of NTFPs, genetic resources, agroforestry 
production, recreational hunting, energy production and distribution… Such “concessions 
2.0” would require an evolution of the legal framework and public policies favouring such 
diversification, as it has started in Congo with recreational hunting associated with timber 
management on the same concessions’ area. This would be acceptable only with the 
recognition of communities’ customary territories (“finages”) within the concessions, to 
develop jointly such new economic activities with the concerned populations (see below the 
recommendation section).  
In the short term, desirable government’s efforts would be to rethink sectoral and cross-sectoral 
policies in order to address the causes of the decline of the regulated timber production (the one 
associated with the concessions implementing management plans). This is essentially a question of 
political will since forestry is not seen as an asset for the “emergence”. Disappointment vis-à-vis the 
financial promises of REDD+ (similar to the over-expectation associated with the Clean Development 
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Mechanism some 15 years ago) played a large role in the current over-priority given to forests in 
Central Africa. Levelling the playing field between committed concessionaires and other players 
would be one of the priorities, and numerous public policy instruments can be mobilized towards this 
objective. Foreign donors might play a role in supporting committed concessionaires to take more 
advantage of the forest management certification.  
K. Policy options for sustainable concessions 
In Central Africa, the future of forest concessions is not encouraging. With the “new interests for 
lands” worldwide for producing food and non-food crops, the profitability gap between sustainable 
forestry and agriculture (especially permanent crops), or more precisely between selective 
exploitation of natural forests and simplified plantation systems (including tree plantations such as 
rubberwood or eucalypts), has increased. The promise of valorisation of “ecosystem services” such as 
carbon sequestration or genetic resources, has not concretized so far and serious doubts arose about 
such promises of a “new forest economy” (beyond timber). On the other hand, revenues from timber 
tend to decrease with a new felling cycle. Even though there is still an important timber potential in 
many concessions, the valorisation of the less-used species would need investments in processing 
techniques, new products and marketing efforts. It seems only a limited number of investors have 
the will to make such investments, given the uncertainty associated with forest concessions in Africa. 
Except in Gabon and northern Congo, the population pressure is increasing and fragmentation of the 
forests due to agriculture is progressing. Governments do not give the timbers sector a high policy 
priority, corruption is rampant in the sector and concessionaires have also to cope with the negative 
image of tropical timber, assimilated to deforestation by the public – a perception fuelled by 
campaigns of large NGOs against industrial logging. The World Bank has been criticized by its 
Inspection Panel in DRC (Inspection Panel, 2007) and Liberia (Inspection Panel, 2010) for the efforts 
devoted to regulate the industrial concessions and the 2013 report of the Internal Evaluation Group 
of the World Bank relayed such criticisms and led the organization to be less active in its efforts for 
reforming the concessions regime (Internal Evaluation Group, 2013). 
The forest concessions in West and Central Africa have one foot in the former colonial era and 
another in the modern “private-public partnership” and/or the “delegated management” pattern 
which are so emphasized in current socio-environmental management debates. The importance and 
weight of concessions in different countries vary with the policy choices made by governments, but 
they are also depending on objective features such as population density, remote forest area and 
transport costs. History, which shapes collective preferences of local inhabitants, also matters. And 
without a tradition of local self-organization – also the consequence of the concessionaire system 
inherited from colonial era – those collective preferences can be in favour of a bargaining 
dependence relationship with the concessionaire rather than an unlikely community development 
externally promoted (Karsenty, 2007). 
The contribution of the forest concessions system to the national economy may appear relatively 
modest in relation to fiscal revenues, compared to, say, oil or job creation, compared to agribusiness. 
However, its full contribution in terms of induced added value is not accurately captured by national 
accounting systems, and is sometimes dissimulated behind transport and trade related contributions 
to GDP. Yet, the forest industry is one of the rare capable to create formal manufacturer 
employment for low-skilled workers in economically marginalized areas. Small-scale forestry is, 
without any doubt, able to create much more work in accessible and close-to-market areas, but not 
in low-populated and landlocked forest zones. In addition, the governance context prevailing in West 
and Central Africa disfavours the development of small-scale enterprises moving away from the 
informality they are confined to by the prevailing policies and the administration’s “predatory” 
behaviour. The formalization – and formal taxation – of the small-scale informal sector is as much an 
economic necessity as a major policy difficulty. 
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In moist tropical forests of Africa, autonomous community forestry is generally not capable to 
replace the industrial concessions and achieve sustainability of timber harvesting through small-scale 
enterprises. Hence, the decline of the industrial concessions regime is simply associated with forest 
degradation and triggers forest conversion at small or large scale. This calls for an evolution of the 
concession regime, more adapted to the growing population pressure and local land rights claims, 
and oriented towards a more intensive use of a wider range of natural resources.  
This evolution should be supported by a set of policy reforms favouring the rule of law and the 
recognition of overlapping tenure rights in the concessions. Key elements of what could be such 
policies are detailed below. 
Zoning plan and establishment of PFEs 
The raison d’être of a forest zoning plan is to propose the area where a permanent forest estate (PFE) 
will be established in law. Too often, zoning plans ambition to define precisely the places where 
various activities should take place, including mining - whose potential location is generally difficult 
to predict-, when it should rather establish policy priorities in the utilization of the lands. It would be 
illusory to believe to prevent mining or oil extraction by establishing a PFE, but the legal existence of 
the PFE can strongly support the implementation of the principle of ecological compensation (avoid, 
minimize, compensate) and might provide legal grounding for overcompensation (financial transfers 
from the extractive industries to forest conservation and restoration).  
An important point is that the establishment of a PFE should not entail changes in the legal status of 
land: private properties or community forests can be encompassed in the PFE, there is no necessary 
correspondence between the Private/Public domain of the State and the PFE. 
Gazetting all the concessions applying FPIC principles 
The zoning plan should be a proposition made by the Government to the populations and land users 
to be negotiated and adjusted when necessary. Gazetting the forests gives a legal basis for 
establishing in law the PFE. Such procedure should follow the Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC)  principle. The acceptance of gazetting could be facilitated by an evolution in the regime of 
tenure inside the concessions, as we will see below. 
Strict procedure for mining inside concessions and obligations of ecological and financial 
compensations for the extractive industries 
If governments decide to issue mining permits within existing concessions on the PFE, it is crucial that 
strict procedures are established to enforce the sequence “avoid damages, minimize them, and 
compensate the residual ones”, associated with international standards for ecological compensation. 
A compensation obligation is more and more a general obligation set by law for extractive industries, 
whatever the land status. When destruction takes place on concessions within the legally established 
PFE, a reinforced obligation can be an “overcompensation”, which adds financial compensation to 
the in-kind ecological compensation.  
Public availability of updated information on concessions (surface, production, holders, etc.) on 
Ministries’ website 
The legitimacy of the concessions depends of the transparency and the possibility to any citizen to 
know the location, size, production and holders of the concessions in near-real time. Updated 
websites can be implemented in the Ministries in charge of the forestry sector, possibly with the 
support of organizations such as OFAC (State of the Forest for Central Africa) or WRI who publish 
Interactive Maps that would benefit from being updated more frequently. 
Inclusion of industrial forestry in the EITI by governments 
Another way of reinforcing the legitimacy of the concessions is to inform the public of the fiscal 
contribution of concessions and forest industries to the national budget and to local public 
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institutions. Since concessionaires are reluctant to publish such information on a voluntary basis (fear 
of unfair competition), the inclusion of the forestry sector in EITI (as it is the case in Liberia, for 
instance) would level the playing field and oblige every concessionaire to disclose such information. 
Systematic mapping of the customary territories (finages) in an out the concessions and 
participative management 
This recommendation is the cornerstone of the evolution of the concession system. Community 
forests and industrial concessions are seen generally as mutually exclusive. On the other hand, within 
the framework of forest management certification, some companies have started mapping the 
customary territories overlapping the industrial concessions and use such maps as a key for benefits 
sharing with local investments decided jointly with communities and proportionate to the area of 
customary territory overlapping the industrial concession. These dynamics, if deepened and 
appropriated by public policies, may trigger a transformation of the concession system in Central 
Africa towards a recognition of overlapping rights associated with different “institutional layers” on 
the same area, and foster an evolution of the property rights exerted over the concession, making 
the communities stakeholders of the concessions. The overlapping areas might not only be a key 
element for benefit sharing, but they could also become joint management areas (including control 
of outsiders, poachers, illegal loggers…) with the development of non-timber economic activities in 
joint-ventures between the industrial concessionaires and the various communities. In that 
perspective, overlapping rights should be recognised by the legal frameworks but also the capacity of 
the stakeholders to valorise other resources than timber on the concession area. Preventing forest 
clearing by permanent cultivation inside the concessions would be a matter of contractual 
agreements that could be supported by PES projects to be undertaken in this framework. 
Organization of the dual dimension of community forestry, combining overlapping areas and 
exclusive community concession areas 
A new generation of forest regulations calls for benefit-sharing with “riparian” populations 
(Cameroon, Gabon), and/or for establishing “community development series” within the industrial 
concessions (Congo). In the DR Congo, the 2014 decree organizing community forestry paves the way 
for a dual conception of such forestry, with the distinction between the “forest of the local 
community” (that is, the customary territory that can overlap with industrial concessions) and the 
“community concession”, this latter being potentially a subdivision of the former but associated to an 
exclusive area (Vermeulen and Karsenty, 2014). 
For community-based concessions, making room for exclusive rights by adjusting the industrial 
concession boundaries to allow for viable small-scale enterprises might be the second part of the 
strategy of recognizing and managing overlapping rights to promote joint management associating 
overlapping and exclusive rights for communities. Gazetting of Forest Management Units, not yet 
completed in Central Africa, would provide the opportunity for adjustments of the boundaries, when 
needed. To allow for this evolution, legal frameworks might be adapted and mainstreamed. Zoning 
policies based on strict land sparing should be reconsidered in favour of a more balanced approach 
allowing for land sharing. 
Cancellation of concessions without management plans deposed after 4 years maximum 
The credibility of management plans is mined by the absence or the modesty of sanctions for 
concessionaires not preparing or not implementing mandatory management plans. If verification of 
the implementation depends on the daily action of the Forest Service, with the potential help of 
Independent Observers, sanctions against those concessionaires lagging behind in the preparation of 
plans are technically easy to apply. In most cases, concessionaires are granted with a 3 year 
provisional contract during which they must prepare and make their plan approved by the Forest 
Service. But in many cases management plans are still “under preparation” several years after the 
expiration of that period and exploitation often ends without any management plan. A simple 
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“golden rule” would be the automatic cancellation of the concession contract after the 3 years 
period, with a maximum extension of one year for specific circumstances. Next forest codes could 
explicitly mention such a rule. 
Use of transferable national quotas for log exports to be auctioned instead of LEB 
There is broad consensus amongst forest economists about the negative impacts of log export bans 
(LEBs). The LEB can reduce value added if processing efficiency is below a certain threshold. When 
this is the case, high quality logs that could be exported at a premium price are instead processed in 
a plant in which efficiency is too low to generate sufficient added-value, leading to high opportunity 
costs compared to log exports. Experiences with LEBs in Africa have not created significant additional 
employment in the forest sector at a whole and have always resulted in a huge drop in the fiscal 
receipts.  
For industrial development purposes, African governments have frequently requested logging firms 
to process a high proportion of their production. This is equivalent to establishing a quota on log 
exports on the annual production. Mandatory processing of a pre-determined portion of production 
imposes high overall compliance costs on the industry. Some firms might have competitive 
advantages in processing the totality of their production, while others may struggle to reach the 
mandatory threshold and might even do so at a cost. This results in a less-than-optimum outcome for 
the whole sector that prevents the progressive specialization of operators, the development of a 
domestic log market and an efficient allocation of timber for processing.  
The alternative is to set up a quota of log export at national level, expressed in volume and calculated 
as a percentage of the estimated domestic production. Such a quota system would allocate the 
scarce timber export resource in the best possible way according to the industry's economic and 
technical characteristics and would minimize the overall economic cost associated with the reduction 
of the resource available for export. Such a quota would also guarantee a minimum supply of raw 
material to installed wood-processing units and is—in principle—quite easy to monitor as export 
points are limited and the maximum exportable volume is determined in advance. The choice for the 
initial award of “log export rights” (LER) includes: 
• A free distribution, according to various criteria ; 
• Sale at an administratively-determined price, be it flat or differentiated according to 
species;  
• Auction with an additional efficiency condition of making LER transferable among exporters. 
In this case, the government can set up a floor price, which would be fine-tuned following a 
learning period. If LER are freely transferable, this will provide some flexibility and reduce 
the risks associated with the international prices thus encouraging higher bids. The 
government would choose one of these options according to its policy objectives. If it wants 
to favour a given category, for instance domestic entrepreneurs, it will probably opt for the 
first or second option. If the government decides to give priority to economic rent capture, 
then the auction solution is the appropriate one. 
Organize logging rights of small-scale loggers with community concessions and in farmer’s fallows 
by adapting tree tenure as in Côte d’Ivoire 
Small-scale loggers are “criminalized” less by the legal framework (when artisanal permits are 
banned) than by the administrative practices making extremely difficult the regular obtaining of 
permits. In addition to potential incentives measures that could encourage Forest Officers to 
facilitate the obtaining of artisanal permits (Cerutti and Lescuyer, 2011), notably in legally established 
community forests, it seems necessary to provide farmers the ownership of trees they have kept in 
their fallows to allow them negotiating their exploitation with artisanal loggers. This principle has 
been introduced in the new forest code in Côte d’Ivoire. But to be enforced, this measure needs to 
be accompanied by a process of land mapping and identification, which is costly and whose 
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completion is a long-term perspective. Nonetheless, through REDD+ and PES initiatives, such land 
operations will certainly multiply and the tree tenure reform can be seen as necessary for evolving 
towards the issuing of legal exploitation by artisanal loggers. 
Provide incentives to certified forest concessions through tax cuts, for instance, area fees. 
Foregone revenues would be compensated by international initiatives (such as REDD+ or FIP) 
Financial rewards could be given to concessionaires who comply with the law and commit 
themselves to independent auditing based on performance through forest management certification. 
One could consider that a concessionaire who invests in independent certification places himself 
under scrutiny and invests in its “reputation”. Certification is both a difficult and long process and 
easy to lose quickly. Compliance with law is the first requirement for internationally recognized 
certification schemes and works as an ally for the Forest Service with respect to law enforcement. 
Thus, tax cuts for certified concessions would be a wise policy and would return fractions of the 
captured economic rents to operators complying with the law, allowing them to offset the cost of 
their organizational investments and diversify their harvests, in line with management plan 
prescriptions.  
To convince governments to give up such tangible fiscal revenues, the international community could 
propose to compensate governments for a given period (8 to 10 years) for the foregone revenues 
derived from the amount of area certified. Through the REDD+ process, donors are committed to 
support SFM as a tool to reduce forest degradation and prevent deforestation. By allowing tax cuts 
for certified concessions to be budget neutral for African governments, donors could contribute in an 
efficient way to the spread of better management practices and legality among concessionaires. This 
seems a realistic way to take up the idea embodied in the so-called “performance bond” scheme 
suggested by several authors (Blakeney 1993, Leruth et al., 2001) but whose implementation seems 
most difficult as long as it is does not take into account the dynamics of independent certification 
schemes. 
Earmark forest taxes for a fund devoted to cover the costs of certification and audits for the 
companies (mutualisation of the cost of certification)  
Tax cuts for certified concessions might be difficult to implement if there is no perspective of 
international compensation. An alternative (or a complement) might be to earmark a fraction of the 
forest taxes paid by all loggers towards a fund co-chaired by the industry and the government  (and 
with NGOs participation), which would allow for a mutualisation of the costs of the certification 
audits for concessionaires willing to move ahead.  
Automatic refunding of VAT for the exporting industries (enforcement of CEMAC recommendation)  
Some African countries (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire) have established specific extra-budgetary accounts 
(abounded by internal VAT receipts) to refund automatically the exporters. Such accounts could be 
located within a regional Central Bank (e.g. BCEAO or BEAC), a measure adopted in Burkina Faso. 
Forest concessionaires would be amongst the first beneficiaries of such a measure. 
Public purchasing policies based on legality 
Governments can decide that all public purchases should meet legality criteria in order to ban non-
verified timber from public buildings.  
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LEGAL PROVISIONS Cameroon Gabon Congo (Rep.) DR Congo Centrafrican Republic (CAR) 
Equatorial 
Guinea Liberia Côte d’Ivoire Ghana 
Date of the Forest 
Law 
 
 
1994 2001 (being 
currently revised) 
2000 (being 
currently revised) 
2002 2000 1997, currently 
being revised 
(a draft law 
revision has 
been 
elaborated in 
2014, pending 
approval) 
2006 2014 1997 (Forest 
Timber 
management 
act) 
Zoning plan of 
forests, with 
vocations of various 
forests areas 
 
Yes, on the 
southern 
part of the 
country 
(dense 
forest area) 
On-going process No No No An ecosystem 
map has been 
developed in 
1999, showing 
production and 
conservation 
zones and 
comprehensive 
information on 
wood supply, 
flora and 
fauna.  
No No  
Permanent Forest 
Estate (legally 
established, non-
established through 
gazetting or 
another procedure) 
  
59 FMU 
gazetted, 
55 pending. 
 
No (only few 
gazetted forests), 
FMU not gazetted 
 
 
No, but gazetting 
production FMUs 
(concessions) is 
contemplated to 
establish the PFE 
 No, the notion of 
FPE not in the 
Forest Code 
No gazetted 
forests 
legally 
established 
1.2 million ha 
allocated. No 
legally established 
PFE 
231 gazetted 
forests, 6 
national 
parks and 8 
natural 
reserves 
Forest 
reserves were 
gazetted 
under 
colonial rule 
to create a 
permanent 
forest estate 
while 
allowing for 
the 
conversion 
over time of 
the remaining 
natural forest 
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into other 
land uses.  
1,6 million ha 
are gazetted 
as forest 
reserves 
Allocation system 
for concessions 
 
 
Public 
auctioning, 
with 
technical 
preselectio
n 
(capacities), 
then 
technical 
proposal 
(30%) and 
financial 
offer (70%) 
for the area 
annual fee  
Administrative 
commission 
analysing the 
proposals, but 
many 
discretionary 
allocations 
Administrative 
commission 
analysing the 
proposals, 
discretionary 
allocations 
frequent 
The Forest Code 
plans a bidding 
system (with 
possible 
exceptions), but 
since 2005 a 
moratorium has 
been established,  
Since 2005 : 
Bidding 
mechanism 
similar to 
Cameroon but 
40% for 
technical 
criteria et 60% 
for financial 
criteria 
Discretionary From 50,000 to 
100,000 ha: 
bidding for 
societies with at 
least 51% 
ownership by 
Liberian citizens. 
Beyond: open 
internationally  
Perimeters of 
Forest 
Exploitation 
(PEF) on the 
rural domain, 
in average 
25,000 ha. 
Discretionary 
allocation. 
In 2003 the 
Timber 
Resources 
Management 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 
inserted a 
procedure for 
competitive 
bidding. The 
bidding 
procedure is 
only open to 
pre-qualified 
companies of 
whom the 
one offering 
to pay the 
highest 
timber rights 
fee shall be 
awarded the 
TUC (Timber 
Utilization 
Contracts) 
Area allocated for 
concessions 
7,2 million 
ha 
Around 14 million 
ha 
12.5 million ha Around 12 million 
ha 
3,7 million 740,000 ha 2.3 million Around 
700,000 ha 
(PEF) 
3. 2 million: 
1.8 million ha 
under long-
term 
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“Forêts 
classées” 
managed by 
the SODEFOR 
not 
accounted for 
(are not 
concessions)  
contracts 
(typically 
between 40 
and 99 years) 
and 1.4 
million ha 
under short-
term 
(typically five-
year) 
contracts 
Legal duration of 
the concessions 
 
 
 
15 years, 
renewable 
once 
One rotation (25 
years), renewable 
15 or 25 years 
renewable 
25 years For the life span 
of the society 
(up to 99 years) 
From 5 to 20 
years 
renewable 
25 years, 
renewable 
10 to 20 
years 
40 years 
Management Plan 
(MP) of concessions 
 
 
The MP 
should be 
prepared 
during the 3 
years 
allowed by 
the 
temporary 
convention 
contract  (3 
years) , but 
often  
Same as in 
Cameroon. Many 
FMUs not yet with 
a management 
plan approved 
Same system as in 
Cameroon. In the 
North of the 
country, 
concessions are 
with MP, but only 
few in the South 
Mandatory since 
the new code. Not 
all the concessions 
with MP 
Only country 
where the 
making of the 
MP is done by a 
public structure 
(the PARPAF 
project) and the 
concessionaires.  
Mandatory, 
but not really 
enforced 
Mandatory. 
Forests degraded 
by previous logging 
and human 
settlements. 
Probable 
unrealistic 
management 
plans. 
No genuine 
management 
plans in the 
PFE, few 
management 
plans 
prepared by 
the SODEFOR 
on the 
gazetted 
forests 
Mandatory 
Log export regime 
 
 
Local 
transformat
ion 
mandatory 
for category 
Full log export ban 
since 2010-2011. 
Log export 
allowed up to 15% 
of the production 
of each 
concessionaire. In 
Normally 70% of 
the production of 
each 
concessionaire 
should be 
60% of the 
production 
should be 
processed 
locally. 
Minimum of 50 
% of local 
processing, 
overtax on log 
exports if not 
Log exports 
authorized from 
concessions 
(banned for Private 
Use Permits) 
Log export 
prohibited 
Log exports 
prohibited 
since 1995. 
The 
legislation 
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1 species 
(so-called 
traditional), 
exportation
s allowed 
based on 
individual 
quotas (for 
ayous and 
azobe) 
against the 
payment of 
an overtax 
for the 
other 
species.  
practice, exports 
well above the 
quotas 
transformed 
locally. Poorly 
implemented 
A finance law 
(2000) raised 
the threshold at  
77%. Poorly 
implemented 
fulfilled. Poorly 
implemented. 
requires all 
wood-
processing 
firms to 
supply 20% of 
their 
production to 
the domestic 
market, but 
this is not 
enforced  
Taxation regime 
and redistribution 
to local entities 
 
 
Annual 
Area Fee 
(AAF) set by 
bidding. 
Average: 
3000 
FCFA/ha (5 
USD) 
 
Felling tax: 
2.5% of a 
so-called 
FOB value 
of the log 
(not 
updated) 
 
Export 
taxes logs : 
Annual Area Fee: 
400 FCFA (0.7 
USD) / ha 
However, since 
2009, bilateral 
agreements 
between some 
companies and 
the Govt lowering 
the amount 
 
Felling tax : 3%, 
5%  or 9% of a so-
called FOB value 
(varying with 
zone), collected at 
the export by the 
Custom 
administration 
(based on  
Annual Area Fee: 
350 FCFA (0.58 
USD) /ha (North) 
500 FCFA (0.8 
USD) /ha (South) 
Discount of 20 % 
in average for 
adjustment to 
productive areas  
 
Felling tax: 3% of 
the “Free On 
Truck” value (FOB 
minus transport 
cost) 
 
Export taxes on 
Annual Area Fee: 
0.60$/ha 
When 
management plan 
agreed, adjusted 
for the productive 
area only 
 
Reforestation tax: 
4% of the “Ex 
Works” value 
(administrative 
FOB price minus 
average transport 
cost by zone) per 
m3 exported  
2% for Tola 
(promotion 
Annual Area 
Fee: 500 
FCFA/ha/year 
(0.83 USD) 
 
Felling tax: 
7% on mercurial 
value (FOB LM 
minus 40%) 
 
Reforestation 
tax : 11% 
mercurial value 
 
Log export tax : 
10.5 % Free On 
Truck (FOT) 
Annual Area 
Fee: between 
2500 et 3000 
FCFA/ha  
(4.5 – 5 USD) 
depending on 
zones 
 
Felling tax : 80 
% of the 
stumpage 
value (itself 
defined as 8% 
of an 
administrative 
FOB) 
 
Log export 
Annual Bid 
Premium (Area-
Based)  
(Bids ranged 
between USD 5 to 
20/ha/year) 
+ 
Annual Area Fee : 
2.50 USD/ ha /year  
 
 
Felling tax: log 
stumpage fee 
based on species 
class: 2.5% to 10% 
FOB  
Log export tax: 
Attribution 
tax: USD 
0.5/ha (once) 
Area tax: USD 
0.16/ha/year 
 
Export tax 
(D.U.S.) 
Timber rights 
fee: annual 
lump-sum fee 
for the entire 
concession 
area, paid by 
the logging 
company. 
Timber rights 
are awarded 
to the bidder 
who offers 
the highest 
annual timber 
rights fee 
 
 
Stumpage 
fee: 35% of 
the FOB price 
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17.5% (an 
overtax of 
around 8,5 
USD is due 
for some 
species 
such as 
Ayous) 
 
Export 
taxes 
processed 
wood: 
5.65% on 
the 
estimated  
FOB value 
of the 
processed 
timber 
 
50% of the 
AAF for the 
local 
councils 
(6.5 million 
USD in 
2013): half 
of this 
amount to 
the local 
council of 
the 
concession, 
the other 
half 
equivalent 
roundwood) 
 
No tax on 
processed timber 
 
800 FCFA (1.33 
USD) per m3 to be 
invested by the 
company in 
development 
activities for 
communities 
which customary 
territory overlaps 
with the 
concession 
 
 
logs: from 8.5 à 10 
% of an 
administrative 
FOB value - 
depending on 
zones 
 
From 0.5 to 4.5% 
of an 
administrative 
FOB value 
 
200 FCFA (0.33 
USD)  ) per m3 to 
be invested by the 
company in 
development 
activities for 
communities on 
“social 
development” 
series within the 
concession 
 
specie). 
Levied only on 
logs exported 
 
Felling tax ; 1.25% 
of the Ex Works 
value (average 
transport cost :  
50 - 80 USD) 
 
Log export tax : 
10% 
administrative 
FOB value 
 
Processed timber: 
5% of and 
administrative 
FOB value 
 
25% of the AAF for 
the Province and 
15% for the 
administrative 
territory 
 
 
value 
(administrative 
FOB price minus 
average 
transport cost  - 
2 zones) 
 
Processed 
timber: 4.5 % 
FOT value (on 
some species 
only) 
 
 
taxes: 30 % 
administrative 
FOB value 
 
Processed 
timber: 10% of 
and 
administrative 
FOB value 
from 2% to 10% of 
FOB price (varying 
with species) 
 
Many other 
administrative fees 
 
Community 
benefits: $1.50/m3 
 
Benefit-sharing 
provisions for local 
communities 
should be in the 
form of a 30% 
share in the land 
rental fees paid by 
concession-
holders, and the 
social agreements 
should specify 
benefits and access 
rights that are to 
be accorded to 
affected 
communities 
of the 
stumpage. 
Since 2004 
the stumpage 
fees for 
timber 
exploitation 
have not 
been 
reviewed. 
 
 
3% levy on 
wood export 
(based on 
FOB value) 
 
Contract area 
rent (when 
the permit is 
on Stool 
land):  USD 
317 year/ha 
for forest 
reserves: 
going to the 
Office of the 
Administrator 
of Stool Lands 
(OASL) 
 
Stumpage 
fee: 50% is 
deducted by 
the Forestry 
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redistribute
d by a Fund 
(FEICOM) 
for 
redistributi
on and 
equalization 
between 
local 
councils  
 
The 10 % of 
the AAF 
earmarked 
for the 
riparian 
local 
communitie
s has been 
suppressed 
since 2014 
 
 
Commission 
and the other 
50% is split 
between the 
OASL and 
other 
beneficiaries 
Certification (forest 
management) 
 
Legality certification 
not taken into 
account 
 
 
3 societies 
certified (14 
FMUs)  
 (940,000 
ha) 
(one 
certified 
concession 
closed in 
2009, 
another 
3 societies 
certified (4 FMUs) 
(2.05 million ha) 
2 societies 
certified (4 FMUs) 
(2.47 million ha) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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certified 
concession 
dropped 
the FSC in 
2014) 
 
Legality 
certification (OLB, 
VLC or FSC-CW) 
2,468,000 
ha 
0 583,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Maximum of 
surface for 
companies 
 
 
200,000 ha 
by society 
(several 
large  
groups 
handle 
more than 
200,000 ha 
up to 
600,00 ha) 
600,000 ha, but 3 
societies get in 
their name more 
than 700.000 ha 
No ceiling 500,000 ha 
(except previous 
rights, some 
groups or 
societies control 
more than 3 
million ha) 
No ceiling 50,000 ha (one 
Malaysian 
society,, 
Shimmer 
International, 
control around 
280.000 ha) 
400,000 ha 
(minimum 50,000 
ha for concessions) 
20.000 ha  
 
Community forests 
or community 
concessions 
 
 
Community 
forests  
(5,000 ha 
maxi)  
167 created 
14 in 
operation 
(51,000 ha) 
for 26,000 
m3 allowed 
annually 
Local 
council 
3 effective 
community 
forests 
Maximum of 
10,000 ha 
The new forest 
code to be 
adopted allowed 
for community 
forestry 
Community 
concessions 
and/or “forests of 
the local 
community” 
Up to 50,000 ha 
Decree issued end 
of 2014 
 
6 pilot 
community 
forests (project 
interrupted) but 
no legal 
provision 
« Bosques 
communales » 
where rural 
communities 
have 
permanent use 
right 
recognized 
31% of the forests 
under community 
forestry 
Forest of the 
rural 
communities 
allowed by 
the 2014 
forest law 
“Stool lands” 
(lands owned 
by pre-
colonial 
communities, 
symbolized by 
wooden 
stools), but 
not working 
as community 
concessions 
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forests  
(minimum 
32) : 
770,000 ha 
 
 
 
Comments 
 
 
Manageme
nt plans not 
effectively 
implemente
d in many 
concessions
, 
questioning 
the 
sustainabilit
y of the 
manageme
nt of large 
tracts of the 
PFE. 
 
 
Forest 
concessions hit by 
the LEB, fiscal 
receipts dropped 
dramatically.   
The southern part 
of the country still 
largely 
unregulated. One 
of the two very 
large certified 
companies for 
sold. 
Taxes poorly 
recovered 
(especially the are 
fees). With the 
decentralization 
(provinces 
recovering some 
taxes), very 
difficult to get 
accurate figures 
on taxes paid 
Lack of 
transparency 
exacerbated 
with the recent 
political crisis  
Country AAC 
set at 450,000 
m3. 
De facto 
monopoly of a 
largest 
Malaysian 
company 
(branch of 
Rimbunan 
Hijau).  
Taxation: 
extremely high 
level of fiscal 
pressure. Only 5% 
of fixed taxes (bids, 
area tax, and 
administrative 
fees) were 
recovered in 2012. 
Overbidding seems 
systematic with 
the intention of 
renegotiating with 
the Govt 
aftermath. 
Sustainability 
questionable: all 
the forests 
overlogged in the 
last 10-15 years 
Timber sector 
in rapid 
decline. 
Gazetted 
forests 
massively 
deforested 
and degraded 
by small-scale 
farmers. With 
the new 
forest law 
giving tree 
tenure to 
formers, PFE 
(concessions 
in the rural 
domain) 
likely to be 
dropped 
progressively 
Actual 
harvest 
(industrial 
and chainsaw 
loggers) 
around 6 
million 
m3/year 
(Lund et al., 
2012), 3 times 
the AAC 
Main commercial 
species harvested 
Ayous 
(Triplochito
n 
scleroxylon) 
Sapelli 
(Entandrop
hragma 
cylindricum) 
Tali 
(Erythrophl
Sapelli 
(Entandrophragm
a cylindricum), 
Okoumé 
(Aucoumea 
klaineana) 
Sapelli 
(Entandrophragm
a cylindricum) 
Ayous 
(Triplochiton 
scleroxylon) 
Sapelli 
(Entandrophragm
a cylindricum) 
Tola (Prioria 
balsamiferum) 
Wenge (Millettia 
Laurentii) 
Afrormosia 
(Pericopsis elata) 
Okoumé 
(Aucoumea 
klaineana) 
Okoumé 
(Aucoumea 
klaineana) 
Fromager/Kapokier 
(Ceiba pentandra) 
Samba 
(Triplochiton 
scleroxylon) 
 
Wawa 
(Triplochiton 
scleroxylon) 
Niangon 
(Herritiera 
utilis) 
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eum 
suaveolens) 
Main export 
countries 
China and 
India for 
logs, EU and 
China for 
sawnwood 
China and 
Vietnam for logs, 
EU and China for 
sawnwood 
Mainly EU for 
sawnwood, China 
for logs 
China for logs, 
mainly EU for 
processed 
products 
China, Vietnam, 
EU 
China EU, USA EU, India and 
neighbouring 
African 
countries 
China and EU 
  
